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ABSTRACT  
The dissertation I present investigates recent developments achieved in the field of policy 
evaluation, exploring the techniques that allow to perform some kind of analysis that look 
beyond traditional objectives: this is the essence of going from ex-post to ex-ante evaluation. 
Conducting an ex-ante evaluation of  a public policy works toward exploring potential results 
of a reform never implemented. Actually, the power of ex-ante evaluation from a policy-
maker prospective is great, since it allows to answer to a wide variety of policy questions. 
This work focuses on the evaluation of public policy concerning education, defining the 
theoretical framework developed over the last decades until the most recent findings. 
Specifically, I consider the education sector of the United Kingdom and perform an empirical 
evaluation of the returns to higher education in this country.  
 
SOMMARIO 
La dissertazione che presento studia gli sviluppi recenti realizzatisi nel campo della 
valutazione delle politiche pubbliche, esplorando le tecniche che permettono di intraprendere 
delle analisi che vadano oltre al raggiungimento degli obiettivi tradizionali: in questo si 
definisce l’essenza del passare dalla valutazione ex-post alla valutazione ex-ante. Condurre la 
valutazione ex-ante di una politica pubblica mira ad esplorare gli effetti potenziali di una 
riforma mai adottata. Effettivamente, la capacità della valutazione ex-ante dal punto di vista 
del policy maker è considerevole, dato che permette di rispondere ad una vasta varietà di 
questioni di politica pubblica. Questo lavoro si concentra sulla valutazione delle politiche 
rivolte al settore dell’educazione, definendo il contesto teorico sviluppatosi negli ultimi 
decenni fino ai risultati più recenti. Nello specifico, prenderò in considerazione il settore 
dell’educazione in Gran Bretagna ed eseguirò una valutazione empirica dei rendimenti 
dell’istruzione superiore in questo Paese. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The dissertation I present investigates recent developments achieved in the field of policy 
evaluation, exploring the techniques that allow to perform some kind of analysis that look 
beyond traditional objectives: this is the essence of going from ex-post to ex-ante evaluation. 
Conventional ex-post evaluation relies on consolidated methods (e.g. instrumental 
variables, difference in difference, regression discontinuity design, etc.) that attempt to extract 
a causal relationship from data with the highest grade of internal validity, ensuring at the same 
time the generalization of results to the external environment, thus the external validity. 
Clearly, this is the first, important and most of the time arduous step to complete. Indeed, 
any other further grade of analysis cannot be achieved if the ex-post evaluation does not 
accomplish these purposes. This consideration is the key point for performing successfully 
ex-ante evaluation. 
Conducting an ex-ante evaluation of  a public policy works toward exploring potential 
results of a reform never implemented. In particular, we can ask ourselves: given the 
existence of a certain policy and its causal effect, what would be the set of policy rules that 
allows to achieve a bigger effect? Actually, the power of ex-ante evaluation from a policy-
maker prospective is great, since it allows to answer to a wide variety of policy questions. It is 
obviously interesting to understand and forecast what would be the most effective means (e.g. 
a subsidy, a training program, the construction of a new school, etc.) that permit to maximize 
a certain measure of output (earnings, employment rate, volume of participants, level of 
personal skills, e.g.) or alternatively, understand if it exists a different set of policy tools that 
allows to achieve the same result while respecting the Government budget constraint. With 
the suitable validated model, ex-ante evaluation permits to fulfil useful cost-benefit analysis. 
Feeling confident of having the availability of the right model is the key point explained 
above. As discussed in Chapter 1., having the possibility of relying on a natural experiment 
would be the perfect starting point to perform all the steps that leads to the ex-ante evaluation. 
In this case, validating the model chosen for the ex-ante analysis means applying it to the data 
provided by the experiment to verify if it permits to replicate the results of the ex-post one. 
The validation process and also the choice of the suitable model, has a particular importance 
and various techniques can be followed. Chapter 1. provides a review of the literature that 
2 
 
 
 
goes through all these aspects and many others, comparing the result achieved by different 
authors.  
This work focuses on the evaluation of public policy concerning education, defining the 
theoretical framework developed in last decades until the most recent findings. Specifically, I 
consider the education sector of the United Kingdom and perform an empirical evaluation of 
the returns to higher education in this country.  
The education sector has addressed the attention of researchers for decades given its  
importance for the economy of all countries. Reforms intended to promote education at all 
levels has to be developed carefully since human capital accumulation is one of the main 
drivers of economics growth. For this reason, Governments should always intervene with the 
appropriate measure to handle this phenomenon.  
When conducting analysis concerning educational output, the main obstacle is represented 
by the unobservable individual characteristics that are considered a source of bias in the 
evaluation of the returns to educational qualification. The relevant literature has progressed 
around the management of consequences implied by these unobservables factors, discussing 
which are the most effective methods to be used and the most important parameters of interest 
to be evaluated. Chapter 2. considers these aspects, with a focus on the literature that starting 
from the 2000s, has been concentrated on exploiting all the methodologies developed and 
results achieved over years, to provide the elements that allows to perform ex-post and ex-
ante evaluation in the field of educational policies.  
In Chapter 3., the features of the higher education sector of the U.K. are presented, with a 
description of the main reforms undertaken by the Governments over last fifty years in order 
to funding a sector that has experienced a huge increase in the number of participants over 
time.  
Finally, Chapter 4., illustrates the empirical results obtained from the application of the 
model presented in previous chapters, discussing limits, difficulties and suggesting possible 
extension.  
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1 FROM THE EX-POST TO THE EX-ANTE POLICY 
EVALUATION 
1.1 POLICY EVALUATION: DEFINITION AND PROBLEMS 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2000, 2-3) define the policy evaluation problem as “the problem of 
comparing outcomes of a policy in place with outcomes under alternative policies” and the 
problem of causal inference “consists of determining which causes affect outcomes and 
measuring their quantitative importance”. They continue specifying that: “The policy 
evaluation problem is a special case of the problem of causal inference which entails 
comparisons between a hypothetical state and the observed state where the “causes” are 
different policies”. 
The causal effect is defined by authors as the change of outcomes for an agent across states 
(s, s’) under the ceteris paribus clause stated by Marshall (1890), that means that only states 
(s, s’) are varied. 
Subsequently, Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a, 4790-2) indicate three main policy 
evaluation problems: 
1. “Evaluating the impacts of historical interventions on outcomes including their impact 
in terms of welfare”. 
2. “Forecasting the impacts (constructing counterfactual states) of interventions 
implemented in one environment in other environments, including their impacts in 
terms of welfare”. 
3. “Forecasting the impacts of interventions (constructing counterfactual states 
associated with interventions) never historically experienced to various environments, 
including their impacts in terms of welfare”. 
The first policy evaluation problem consists in that of internal validity: identifying one or 
more given treatment parameters in a given environment. The second one consists in the 
problem of external validity, defined as the evaluation of one or a set of treatment parameters 
estimated in one environment to another environment; the term environment refers to 
different groups of people or different time periods with respect to those that are object of 
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study, but sharing the same characteristics. The last policy evaluation problem consists 
essentially in the ex-ante policy evaluation.  
Authors define the term impact as the construction of individual level or population level 
counterfactuals and their valuations. Evaluating impacts of historical interventions on welfare 
means conducting a welfare evaluations, either ex-ante or ex-post, of the outcomes derived 
from agents and/or society behavior and interventions.  
With respect to the last two policy evaluation problems, authors specify that “these 
forecasting problems are special cases of the problem of causal inference in which 
extrapolation from knowledge of currently experienced states is required to forecast and 
evaluate states not previously experienced” (see Heckman and Vytlacil 2000, 3).  
What I am going to present in the following chapters involve precisely the achievement of 
the three aspects of policy evaluation. The path begins by exploiting ex-post methodologies, 
both internally and externally valid, in order to develop a credible approach that is able to 
make ex-ante policy evaluations. As Di Nardo and Lee (2011) say, the main aim of ex-post 
evaluation strategy is to achieve the highest degree of internal validity, “a high degree of 
confidence that what is measured indeed represents a causal phenomenon”. They state that 
these methodologies pursue a goal which is complementary to that of ex-ante policy 
evaluations. Indeed, “(…) we view “external validity” to be the central issue in an attempt to 
use the results of an ex post evaluation for an ex ante program evaluation”. (see Di Nardo and 
Lee, 2011, 13). The main difference between the two approaches is that in the ex-post 
evaluation the credibility of the analysis depends on the “credibility of the statistical model of 
the experiment” whereas, in an ex-ante evaluations the credibility is focused on the “statistical 
model of the behaviour of individuals”, and the aspect that make the second one more hard to 
achieve than the first is that, in ex-ante analysis, validation occurs in context which are 
different than those in which data have been collected.  
Attaining this objective implies unavoidably the need of managing some conventional 
estimation problems known in the policy evaluation literature. By adopting the notation used 
by Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a), you can interpret Y (s, ω) as the outcome corresponding to 
the state (policy or treatment) s for agent ω, with ω ∊ Ω, realized after the treatment’s choice. 
Before knowing the treatment, agents can make forecasts about it. In fact, it is exactly the 
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potential influence derived from these forecasts about future outcomes that can generate the 
problem of selection bias.  
An individual when considering whether to participate or not can be influenced by his/her 
considerations about futures potential outcomes and this give rise to a selection problem. The 
greatest advantage of social experiment is precisely that of avoiding self-selection problems 
that could give raise to selection bias. When the treatment assignment rule is randomization, 
receipt of treatment is independent of outcomes of treatment.  
Problems arise when assignment depends on choices of agents. An example is given by the 
Roy model, in which agents choose which treatment has to be received by themselves or other 
agents (e.g. parents choosing for their children) by evaluating potential returns of alternative 
treatments. In a “utility-maximization framework” agents choose the one that provides the 
highest income, and this self-selection (as I will show in more details later) does not allow to 
estimate properly the outcome (see Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2010). 
Continuing with the same notation, authors define the individual level causal effect for 
individual ω that compares objective outcomes of treatment s with those of treatment s’ as: 
Y(s,ω) – Y(s’,ω),  with s≠s’.  
Clearly, it is not possible to observe the same individuals in both states of the world; this 
problem is known as the fundamental problem of causal inference (see Holland, 1986). 
This is a central problem in policy analysis and typically, it is handle by trying to estimate 
a population version of the individual level parameter defined above, therefore a population 
level treatment parameter.  
Indeed, Heckman and Vytlacil (2007a, 4802) state that: “The conventional approach in the 
treatment effect literature is to reformulate the parameter of interest to be some summary 
measure of the population distribution of treatment effects like a mean or the distribution 
itself rather than attempting to identify individual treatment effects”. I will turn to this point 
later when discussing the parameters of interest in policy evaluation.  
The second way to handle the fundamental problem of causal inference is recurring to the 
structural econometric analysis. Under a well specified economic theory it is possible to 
model Y(s,ω) in all its determinants. Thus, it is possible to understand the mechanism 
generating outcomes and choices of agents modelling also their dependence. 
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“Constructing this counterfactual in a convincing way is a key ingredient of any serious 
evaluation method”. As pointed out by Blundell and Dias (2009), it exists three main classes 
of policy evaluation methods: the experimental method that exploits randomized experiments, 
the non-experimental methods and the structural methods.  
The assignment rule, so the way in which individuals are allocated to one group or another 
in the program or the way in which they receive the policy, is pure randomly in the social 
experiment, while in non-experimental method the researcher tries to mimic the 
randomization exploiting non-experimental data. 
1.2  A COMPARISON OF EX-ANTE AND EX-POST METHODS: LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
The aim of this section is to investigate the recent developments in the evaluation of public 
policies. One of the main concern of this field is trying to implement an efficient method to 
evaluate public interventions in order to evolve from the so-called ex-post approach typically 
followed in the treatment effect literature. What I mean is, finding a way that allows the 
researcher to design an as less costly as possible evaluation structure but at the same time 
achieving a degree of credibility of the tool as high as possible. Technically this 
methodologies fall within the field of the ex-ante evaluation processes and they are 
implemented through structural models. Many researchers in last years have studied this topic 
moved by the need of evolving from the experimental approach. Indeed, a controlled 
experiment is often not possible to implement, can be too costly and time-consuming and the 
consequently ex-post analysis may highlight the need of further adjustments of the policy or 
some elements of it; but again this is costly and time-consuming.  
These difficulties may be overcame, at least partially, by the introduction of ex-ante 
methodologies. These ones anyway, are not free of disadvantages, as I will explain later. 
However, exploiting the advantages of both approaches may lead to an efficient and credible 
evaluation.  
Heckman (2010) in his work introduces how to merge ex-ante and ex-post evaluation.  He 
illustrates the pros and cons of both “structural” and “policy evaluation” approaches.  
This distinction finds its roots in the previous distinction of the approaches pursued in 
evaluating microeconomics problems; (see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000). Authors compare 
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the “structural approach” with the “treatment effect approach”; they argue that a structural 
model is designed to achieve different objectives, such as providing a framework for causal 
inference, evaluating the effects of different policies in place and performing forecasting 
analysis to construct counterfactuals of current policies or of policies never implemented. The 
treatment effect approach instead pursue a more precise objective: policy evaluation. 
Forecasting is not included in this approach. 
Heckman (2010) underlines the fact that one important difference between structural 
approach and conventional program evaluation approach (treatment effect approach) is that 
the first makes explicit assumptions about the behavior and decision-making process of the 
agents whereas the latter does not. The program evaluation approach just emphasizes the 
power of the randomized experiment that allows to identify the outcome without having to 
explain how preferences of agents are formed, how the mechanism determining 
counterfactual states acts or which are the sources of variability among agents. Therefore, 
structural approach focuses on the causal mechanism, program evaluation approach on the 
causal effect. The first allows forecasting the effects of policies which have never been 
implemented, the second just analyzes the effects only after the policy’s implementation. This 
distinction however, can be seen not just as a limitation of one of these approaches or of both 
of them, but instead as the key that can be used as a leverage to make one method as the 
continuation of the other. 
Pronzato (2012) in her work makes a comparison between the quasi-experimental 
approach and the structural one by showing their implementation in the analysis of a reform 
of lone parental welfare. She works on the same data and uses the same outcome variable for 
the two strategies. For the quasi-experimental evaluation, she considers the sample of 
Norwegian lone mothers for the treatment group, and mothers in a couple for the control 
group, both before and after the reform, estimating the effect with the triple-difference 
method. 
The sample for the structural model consists of a sub sample of just lone mothers observed 
before the reform, a construction chosen for a typical ex-ante evaluation, as we will see in 
other works. Here the message she gives is: “the two strategies help the understanding of 
policy impact in a complementary way: while the focus of the quasi-experimental evaluation 
design is to measure what really happened, the challenge of the structural model is to predict 
what potentially can happen”. (see Pronzato, 2012,  17-8) 
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This study provides results of the two methodologies which are very close. This can 
suggest that the reconciliation between the two improve their credibility. Indeed, when the 
predictions obtained by the structural estimation match the results of the quasi-experimental 
analysis one can say that the model is validated. But note that the validation applies mutually: 
it makes both methods credible. When this happens, the researcher can feel safer that the 
predictions about future policy’s development is more robust; moreover, this allow to limit 
the cost of policy implementation. 
The complementarity of the two approaches appears even more clear when highlighting the 
limitation of using just one of them. For instance, in her work the author specifies the fact that 
in the quasi-experimental approach we can observe how mother’s behaviour change after the 
implementation of the reform, but we cannot disentangle different effects of the different parts 
of the reform. Consequently, it is not even possible to predict the most suitable policy’s 
improvement that could be implemented in the future unless another reform is undertaken. 
But, implementing a structural model full specified in its parameters, permit to overcome this 
obstacle.  
Clearly, even the structural approach presents some drawbacks. In particular, its 
computational complexity leads to achieve replication and sensitivity analysis not so easily. 
Model parametrization can be most of the time very difficult. Indeed, the model has to rely on 
a certain number of assumptions concerning functional forms and distributions of 
unobservables. Anyway, even in this case connecting ex-post and ex-ante analysis simplifies 
the work.  
In their work, Duflo, Hanna and Ryan (2012) use both a randomized experiment and a 
structural dynamic model of labour supply to test whether monitoring activity and a set of 
incentives increase teachers’ presence at school in India. Why have they chosen this 
technique? Because making just an ex-post analysis prevents from the analysis of the effects 
of some alternative kinds of incentive schemes that differ from the one experimented. 
Moreover, since they put teachers in the treatment group under control (by monitoring daily 
their presence at school) in addition to grant them with a non-linear incentives’ scheme, the 
use of the structural model allows to disentangle the effect of the monitoring from that of the 
financial incentive. Also in this case the structural model is estimated using just the daily 
attendance data in the treated schools. This procedure is called holdout samples and is useful 
for the validation of the model. Here, in particular, the treatment group is chosen for the 
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estimation since the financial scheme provides the necessary variation for model 
identification.  
To test the sensitivity of the model they construct different specifications of it based on 
different kinds of assumptions concerning unobserved heterogeneity and the error structure.  
As authors say: “A primary benefit of estimating a structural model of behaviour is the 
ability to calculate outcomes under economic environments not observed in the data”. (See 
Duflo, Hanna and Ryan 2012, 1265-6). 
Indeed, just thanks to the structural model they are able to identify the cost-minimizing 
combination of the elements of the policy: the amount of the incentive and the minimum 
number of days of work that each teacher has to complete to get it.  
Maybe one of the most known work in the literature scene is the one of Todd and Wolpin 
(2010a). They exploited the randomized social experiment conducted by the Mexican 
government in rural areas consisting in a conditional cash transfer program called 
PROGRESA, to assess its effect on children’s school participation. Since the randomized 
experiment, even if simple to estimate, avoids the evaluation of alternative designs of the 
program, they adopted a behavioural model to estimate the effect of never implemented 
programs; they made therefore an ex-ante evaluation.  
In their previous work (see Todd and Wolpin, 2006) they implemented a discrete choice 
dynamic programming model where parameters are estimated by simulated maximum 
likelihood; here, they exploited child wages variation across untreated villages, without using 
the variability induced by PROGRESA. Experimental variation is used by the author only for 
validate the model. In the subsequent work (see Todd and Wolpin, 2010) they investigate the 
use of a non-parametric dynamic model, that means a model where assumptions about 
functional forms are not specified. This aspect represented a great achievement in the attempt 
of reducing the computational burden of structural model but it is not free from drawbacks. 
In general, behavioural models are applied to programs that affect the budget constraint, in 
particular modifying the costs side. When modelling the behaviour of agents, the researcher 
does not need all those data required to implement a matching or control function approach 
about treated and untreated; this is why they can be applied for ex-ante evaluation. Authors 
specify that not even strong functional form assumptions are necessary: they exploit the 
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condition for which non-parametric policy evaluation are met for a variety of policy 
intervention. 
This methodology really simplifies the computational complexity but at the cost of 
maintaining some strong independence assumptions on the distribution of observed 
heterogeneity.  
Typically, for their identification, structural model need that data about the policy 
instrument provide a source exogenous variation. The policy variables in question, must affect 
only the budget constraint without affecting directly the outcome equation. 
As authors say “Ex ante evaluation requires extrapolating from past experience to learn 
about effects of hypothetical programs”. (see Todd and Wolpin, 2010a, 262). 
Todd and Wolpin perform nonparametric estimation of a cash transfer to parents 
conditional on their children attending school. This is a subsidy that should incentivize school 
attendance by influencing the family’s budget constraint. Since authors consider an initial 
situation in which school is free, they do not have past data about tuitions from which to 
extrapolate variation. So they can estimate the model even if there is not a direct variation in 
the data related to the policy instrument, because the cash transfer is considered as a wage 
subsidy that enters in the budget constraint. By studying wage variation in the data they can 
analyze ex-ante the policy effect; the comparison is made constructing two budget constraint 
that refer to individuals that differ only in wage level. The subsidy act only through the 
budget constraint so it represents the exogenous source of wage’s variation that permit to 
identify the model. This is a key assumption of this method. 
Here, a sort of “matching” is performed by equating particular functions of observables, 
not the observables directly as in the traditional matching estimator used in the ex-post 
analysis.  
The second key assumption is that unobserved heterogeneity is independent of wage and 
other variables entering the budget constraint. This assumption is very restrictive because 
preferences of individual that affect school participation are likely to be correlated with 
factors related to the conditioning set. Authors manage this problem by conditioning also on 
some observable individual characteristics, even if this step can be non-trivial and goes 
counter-current with respect to the goal of reducing the model’s complexity. 
Anyway, the main two limitations of this approach are: 
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- The estimation is based on a comparison that match groups of individuals exactly just 
at two different points of the wage distribution; 
- moreover, this method cannot be applied to all classes of programs. 
Also in this article, we have seen an example of the holdout sample method. Indeed, 
authors say that they “match” untreated individuals with other untreated individuals. So, they 
use the control group for their estimation, which result is compared with that of the already 
realized randomized experiment that serves as benchmark to validate the behavioural model. 
Todd and Wolpin (2010b) and Keane, Todd and Wolpin (2011), examines in depths the 
most important characteristics of the discrete choice static/dynamic programming models, 
widely applied to the ex-ante evaluation and that falls in the category of structural estimation. 
Todd and Wolpin (2010b, 22) provide a useful definition of the discrete dynamic 
programming model, a model “in which agent make choices sequentially over time from a 
discrete set of alternatives as new information arrives to maximize their expected utility over 
some time horizon”. They review some studies concerning empirical policy evaluation of 
different policies in developing countries using this kind of model. Moreover, they introduce 
these applications with a precise analytical presentation of the features of static and dynamic 
programming models.  
Discrete choice models, both static and dynamic, are based on the latent variable 
specification. This framework considers that individuals make a decision at discrete time 
intervals, choosing between two (or more) alternatives given different state of the world. The 
latent variable function determines the outcome of the decision process, given the difference 
in payoff from choosing one of the alternatives. The payoff is a result of a typical problem of 
maximizing the utility under the budget constraint. Therefore, the latent variable may entails 
considerations about revenues and costs, the history of past decisions and some observed and 
unobserved variables that influence the final decision (either contemporaneous or lagged and 
contemporaneous depending on whether the model is static or dynamic respectively). 
The aim of structural model so far cited, is exactly estimating the parameters of the latent 
variable function, which is not observed. Todd and Wolpin (2010b, 23) define the structural 
estimation as “the recovery of fundamental parameters of behavioural models, such as utility 
or technological parameters”. The non-structural approach instead estimates only a certain 
function of the structural elements. 
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A paper which follows a methodology very close to the one of Todd and Wolpin (2010a) is 
that of Ranjeeta (2010) which studies the effects of a conditional cash transfers to improve 
education and health in Nicaragua; it is another example of validating a structural model with 
the results obtained by a randomized social experiment realized in 2000. Ex-ante evaluation 
consists in a semi-parametric single index model that once validated is applied to simulate 
two alternative policy scenarios. The author extends the approach followed by Ichimura and 
Taber (2000) and the one of Todd and Wolpin (2010a) we have seen, that consists in 
estimating reduced form equations using minimal assumptions of functional form and 
estimating semi-parametrically the behavioural model to compare the predictions of it with 
the result of the experiment.  
In order to evaluate the structural model, he does not estimate the structural parameters but 
instead relies on exogenous variation in observed policy variables. Policy variables that affect 
only the budget constraint and not directly the outcome equation are school costs and full 
income.   
School costs do not include tuition because school is free in Nicaragua; so they include 
exogenous expenditure faced by families independently of tuition. They are observed only for 
families that have already enrolled their children at school; in order to achieve observability 
for the whole sample of children, school costs are predicted. Survey used to retrieve the data 
contains information about full wealth of families.  
Also in this paper, author matches untreated individuals with other untreated individuals 
and the group of the treated in the ex-post analysis is used to make comparison of results and 
validate the model. Ex-ante results perfectly predicts results from experimental evaluation. 
Even in this paper the author underlines the sense of this methodology: “Comparing the ex-
ante results to the experiment provides a way of validating the model used. The validated 
models are then used to simulate alternate policy scenarios” (see Ranjeeta 2010, 23). 
The effects of alternative policy scenarios are estimated for two health outcome variables, 
health check of children below 3 years and full coverage of vaccination, and enrolment rate as 
school outcome variable.  
Keane, Todd and Wolpin (2011) defines four possible approaches to estimate a dynamic 
model:  
1. non-parametric, non-structural; 
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2. parametric, non-structural; 
3. non-parametric-structural; 
4. parametric, structural. 
First of all, all approaches require an exclusion restriction. Recalling what we have seen in 
the paper of Todd and Wolpin (2010a), there was needed an exogenous source of variation of 
wages, provided in that case by the subsidy. It acts only through the budget constraint and 
does not affect directly preferences entering in the alternative-specific utility function. So 
wage variation is exogenous, is independent of preferences. This is the key assumption to 
identify the model. More generally, the exogenous variation provides a policy-relevant 
variation, necessary when estimating the effect of a policy. The effect of wage on 
participating decision is isomorphic to that of a subsidy. Having a policy-relevant variation 
allows to estimate the policy effect even without having direct variation in the policy 
instrument (like for example the variation in tuition). Both tuition and exogenous wage 
variation are independent of individual preferences affecting utility, so studying data about 
one of them allows to identify the model.  
Typically, once the model has been identified, only the parametric-structural approach 
allows for counterfactual policy analysis. Todd and Wolpin (2010a) have nevertheless, made 
a non-parametric structural estimation of the conditional cash transfer program on the 
probability of participation of children to school. However, they demonstrate that this 
estimation approach is only feasible when wages offer are observed. Without observing wage 
for those who do not work more assumptions about functional forms are needed. 
As I have already said, in order to achieve counterfactual analysis implementing structural-
parametric estimation of static/dynamic programming models, we need functional forms and 
distributional assumptions. In particular, assumptions are needed about unobserved 
heterogeneity. As Todd and Wolpin (2010b, 29) say, it consists in “permanent differences 
across agents that potentially affect the decision that they make but that are unobserved by the 
researcher”. Assuming that the stochastic component of the model are mutually serially 
uncorrelated simplifies greatly the computational burden and the estimation procedure. 
Anyway, estimate the model with difference specification can be useful for its validation.  
Todd and Wolpin (2010b) list the two most important reasons for which structural 
estimation is useful. The first is that, it allows to separate the effects of individual preferences 
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and opportunities (policy interventions) on final outcome, helping understand which aspects 
have to be modified for achieve a certain desired outcome. The second is that structural 
estimation allows to analyse policy interventions never implemented and that maybe cannot 
be implemented (e.g. for economic reasons) and therefore that could never be assessed. 
Moreover, typically the experimental design can assess only policy intervention of a limited 
duration; long term evaluation can be instead achieved with structural models.  
After having described some basic features of structural models, I continue hereinafter, 
presenting some other empirical studies that combine ex-post and ex-ante techniques together. 
Di Porto, Elia and Tealdi (2013) present an ex-ante and ex-post social program evaluation 
on labour tax evasion in Italy. So, they investigate how the combination of different policy 
instruments impacts the reduction of tax evasion without raising unemployment. In their ex-
post analysis they study if the reform approved in Italy in 2003, concerning the legislation 
about temporary contract and apprenticeship, had some effect on the reduction of informal 
work. Then, “using the ex-post findings as a background to design a theoretical model”, they 
make an ex-ante analysis through a structural model to simulate different policy interventions 
(that include changes in tax burden, penalty fee for tax evaders, firing costs and type of 
contracts) in order to find the optimal one that allows to achieve the outcome desired. The ex-
post analysis is achieved by a DiD and triple difference analysis. Then, they realize a 
continuous time search and matching model to evaluate (ex-ante) the effect of temporary 
contracts in the informal sector. The estimation is made by modelling the labour market both 
before the reforms when only permanent contracts were in place and post reforms when 
temporary contracts have been added (see Di Porto, Elia and Tealdi, 2013, 11-23). In this 
paper, parameters are calibrated choosing their values according to some sources: literature 
about the topic, Italian legislation and statistics provided by the National Institute for 
Statistics (ISTAT). 
The findings of this research show that by just analysing the effects of the 2003 reform, 
temporary contracts alone are not an efficient instrument to drive the “emersion” 
phenomenon. As we have already see, ex-post evaluation alone does not allow to study the 
effects of the potential different elements of a reform combined together to find the optimal 
mix. Applying different policy mix through an experimental design would be prohibitively 
costly. Structural estimation overcomes this limit and, as authors did, allow to define an 
optimal policy mix. What maybe miss in this work is a validation mechanism. The structural 
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model calibration results somewhat complicated in particular when calibrating firing costs, as 
authors explain. (See Di Porto, Elia and Tealdi, 2013, 23-4). They do not implement the 
estimation via an holdout sample techniques in which they could have estimate the parameters 
modelling the labour market just before the reform and then comparing results with the post-
reforms analysis.  
Wasmer (2012) evaluate the 1989 welfare policy reform implemented in France. It consists 
in studying the effects on employment of a living allowance granted to all individual 
satisfying certain requirements. The interesting technical aspect of this work is the fact that 
the author calibrates a matching model with the estimates provided by the ex-post analysis 
realized with a DiD method. It can be noted that, contrary to the calibration realized in the 
work mentioned before (see Di Porto, Elia and Tealdi, 2013) here, Wasmer applies this 
method in order to calibrate and validate at the same time its model. He first implements a 
difference-in-difference and triple difference-in-difference method identifying the control and 
treatment groups that allow to control for different regional trends and also performs various 
robustness check and falsification exercises. Once he feels safe that the estimates are robust, 
he uses them to calibrate the key parameters of the labour market model to run a number of 
counterfactual policies including also the most recent French reform (of 2007) that provided 
changes in the previous one implemented in 1989. The steps he follows are the following:  
- estimate the coefficient of the model prior to the reform to achieve some targets 
observed in the market pre-reform; 
- calibrate the model using the DiD estimates of the economy post reform; 
- finally, once the model is fully parametrized run counterfactual experiments (e.g. see 
the employment effects that would have been obtained in 1989 if 2007 reform had 
been implemented at that time). 
Wasmer (2011, 30) says: “our results are a first step toward integrating ex-post estimations 
of public policies into ex-ante structural approaches”. 
Geyer, Haan, Wrohlich (2012), estimate an intertemporal structural model of labour supply 
for mothers with young children receiving some governmental benefits and then validate their 
model exploiting a parental leave reform introduced in Germany, to define a natural 
experiment. 
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The structural estimation is made by modelling the market under the reform and taking 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) in order to simulate the effect of 
the reform of 2007 and then, the same reform is analysed through a natural experiment using a 
different source of data. Results are compared and model validated. The validation of the 
model provides encouraging results suggesting that the structural model can be used to 
estimate the causal effect of a policy reform.  
Even this work provides an evidence that combining experimental and structural approach 
can avoid many evaluations problems; indeed, authors say that (see Geyer, Haan, Wrohlich 
2012, 1) “it is often criticized that structural models rely on strong assumptions that need to 
be imposed. Therefore, opponents of the structural approach question the reliability of those 
policy evaluations and instead suggest to exploit true exogenous variation for the 
identification of the causal effect on behavior induced by a policy reform”.  
Brewer et al. (2006) have studied the impacts of a change in in-work benefits (the Working 
Families’ Tax Credit – WFTC) on labour market behaviour of families with children 
introduced in the U.K. in 1999. They designed a discrete choice structural model using micro-
data before and after the transfer program to evaluate the program’s incentives of the 
participation rate (through participation costs) and the effects on labour supply.   
In this work, the advantages coming from the structural model highlighted by the authors 
are: 
- separating effects of in-work benefits from other contemporaneous taxes and benefits 
changes; 
- controlling the program’s self-selection effects. 
The program was implemented at a national level and participation was contingent on 
eligibility criteria. Therefore it has been not design as a controlled experiment and this imply 
the lack of a control group.  
Authors indeed, model a structural model of labour supply including participation of 
eligible individuals; they follow a non-parametric identification approach relying just on 
functional form assumptions and considering as the source of variation the changes in taxes 
and benefits over time and different eligibility status of individuals, both acting through the 
budget constraint.  
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Having the data available, they validated the capability of the model to capture the labour 
force participation, hours worked and program participation by comparing the predicted 
values with the actual ones. They subsequently perform some counterfactual analysis 
concerning the effects of alternative combination of the tax and benefit system both for lone 
mothers and couple families. Finally, they compare their estimations with those of other 
studies concerning ex-ante evaluation of the same program with a structural model, ex-post 
evaluation exploiting a natural experiment and estimation of the same program in other 
countries.  
This work represents an example of another possibility to design a structural model to 
evaluate a counterfactual policy starting from the actual state of the world that supplies the 
necessary data to design the framework and to test the estimation of the suggested model. 
Moreover, without having a controlled experiment that provide the basis for the comparison, 
it is still possible to try to validate the model gleaning from other studies and analysis both ex-
ante and ex-post. 
Blundell (2006, 424-5) says: “As a precursor to the analysis I will have to convince you of 
the validity of the structural model estimates. For this I will make a comparison with a simple 
difference in difference evaluation strategy. Although not providing sufficient information for 
policy simulation or the assessment of optimality, simple difference in difference evaluations 
can be valuable for validating the specification of more fragile microeconometric models”. 
Remaining in the field of tax credit polices reforms in the U.K., Blundell (2006) evaluates 
the optimality of Earned Income Tax Credit Policies for lone parents in the U.K. and compare 
tax credit policy reforms in the U.S. (EITC) and the U.K. (WFTC). 
His methodology consists first in assessing the validity of a dynamic model of labour 
supply by comparing the estimation of the impact of the implemented policy with that of a 
difference in difference analysis. Once the structural model is validated he studies the 
optimality of tax credit policies. The analysis of optimality is driven by the consideration that 
many times labour economics just focuses on the analysis of the average impact of a reform. 
Here the author wants to investigate whether the mentioned policy is optimal for low income 
individual, this means focusing of the intensive margin
1
 of labour supply responses. The 
                                                          
1
 As Blundell, Bozio and Laroque (2013, 2) define: “(…) we split the overall level of work activity into the number 
of individuals in work and the intensity of work supplied by those in work. This reflects the distinction between 
whether to work and how much to work at the individual level and is referred to, respectively, as the extensive 
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objective is maximizing a well-behaved social welfare function subject to a government 
budget constraint. 
Even in this example, author notices that: “On their own quasi-experimental approaches do 
not identify all the parameters necessary to assess optimality” Blundell (2006, 433). This is 
because in their analysis they need to have an estimation of the elasticities of labour supply 
response, whereas quasi-experimental and experimental approaches estimate just the average 
treatment effect. Again, this represents the main limitation of these procedures that can be 
overcame through a structural approach. Nevertheless, authors themselves underline the need 
of exploiting in any case the contribution of this approach: “(…) they can be used to assess 
the validity of structural estimates of the elasticity parameters”, Blundell (2006, 433). 
Indeed, author proceeds by investigating the literature to define the characteristics of the 
structural model of labour supply including take up rate, and adopting a matching difference 
in difference approach to define the policy impact using data before and after the reform 
comparing potentially eligible parents with not eligible one in the control group and making 
assumptions on unobservables.  
The source of variation needed to identify the model come from housing costs and local 
taxation that, as always, acts through the budget constraints across individuals in the sample; 
instead, the specification of assumptions needed, in particular concerning unobserved 
heterogeneity, comes from related works.  
Finally, he runs the simulation of WFTC policy reform. He studies how the labour supply 
behaviour of individuals varies when parameters of tax and transfer system vary. 
Thoresen and Vattø (2013), put all their efforts in demonstrating how it is possible to 
reconcile the quasi-experimental approach with the structural one, given the growing 
dominance of the latter in the policy analysis. In the field of tax and benefits reform, authors 
follow the reasoning of Blundell (2006) and validate a discrete choice model of labour supply 
with a reduced form panel data analysis. An important topic in the field of taxation consists in 
the concept of elasticity of taxable income (ETI): a parameter that measures the response in 
taxable income to a change in the net-of-tax rate. They compare the “ETI literature” with the 
structural estimation. In the ETI literature, typically, panel data of actual labour income levels 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and intensive margin of labour supply. At the aggregate level the former is typically measured by the number of 
individuals in paid employment and the later by the average number of working hours” 
19 
 
 
 
before and after the reform are used. The reform is necessary for identification, provided by 
panel data that gives net-of-tax rate variation across individuals and time. The approach 
involves the individual’s utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, using IV 
techniques to deal with endogeneity problems, and employing the difference-in-difference 
estimator.  
As authors say: “although the discrete choice labor supply model continues to be a key 
instrument for predicting policy changes, serious concerns have been raised about the ability 
of structural models to generate robust predictions about the effect of policy changes, (…), it 
is essential to use other source of information to validate the models” (see Thoresen and 
Vattø, 2013, 5). 
In this peculiar side of the literature, the comparison necessary for the validation of the 
structural model has to be made carefully since the ETI methodology estimates the average 
treatment effect for the treated, while the labour supply model gives us responses that differ 
along the income scale. To do so, first, the structural model estimate earning pre- and post-
reform under exogenous wage assumption and finally, the same regression framework of the 
ETI approach is used to estimate elasticities for the simulated earning levels. These estimation 
are compared with estimation obtained using reduced form panel data analysis. Results are 
similar.  
The aim is the one common for all policy analysis: the ETI methodology measures the 
average elasticities that follow a specific tax change reform and is not informative about other 
potential reform. Having a validated structural model may, therefore, overcome this 
limitation.  
To remain in the sphere of taxation implications, Bourguignon and Ferreira (2003), review 
ex-ante evaluation techniques based on estimation and simulation of structural econometric 
models of household behaviour. They model labour supply effects of tax-benefits systems in 
developed countries and simulate effects of potential reforms in those countries. They 
underline how ex-post analysis are undoubtedly useful, even if they are necessary but not 
sufficient alone to allow the policy maker to define the proper policies to achieve some 
desired results. When an ex-post analysis of an existing policy shows that some features have 
to be reformed, it then will turn to be essential to determine a list of possible alternatives and 
find the optimal one in term of outcomes and implementation costs. In order to do so, authors 
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define some counterfactuals which depend on changing of household behaviour once reforms 
are implemented. 
They affirm: “such an analysis is marginal because it is meant to capture differences from 
the status quo. Also, it is almost necessarily behavioral, because of the need to generate 
counterfactuals that take agent responses into account (…) this requires some model, which 
transforms the actual sample into the counterfactual one.” (see Bourguignon and Ferreira, 
2003, 3). 
Bernal and Keane (2010), compare the impact of maternal and alternative care providers’ 
time inputs on children’s cognitive development, since empirical studies in the literature show 
that this last one seems to be highly correlated with future labour market outcomes. In this 
interesting work, authors need to manage a problem of self-selection given that mother’s 
employment and childcare use decisions tend to be correlated with unobserved characteristics 
of mothers and children. Therefore, given a longitudinal data sample of lone mothers, they 
exploit some reforms concerning aids to families as an exogenous source of variation on the 
incentive to work/use childcare, essential to the identification of the effects of mother’s 
work/childcare decision on child outcomes. These effects are identified through a structural 
approach. Indeed, in their specification authors want to study the effect of the time dedicated 
by the mother to their children; for this reason, comparing just average outcomes under an 
instrumental variable approach may over-identify the impact since it will include the effect of 
changing not only time inputs but also good inputs. This aspect can be clearly handled by 
modelling a structural model of mother’s employment and childcare decision. Moreover, with 
such a model authors can manage the problem of unobserved heterogeneity affecting decision 
rules. In particular the methodology is called “quasi-structural” since they “approximate” 
decision rules for employment and childcare use and then estimates these ones jointly with a 
child cognitive ability production function and mother’s wage function. In this approach the 
difference with respect to a fully specified structural model is that the last one includes 
expectations about futures, in this case for example about changes in welfare rules.  
As for all structural models, the identification is granted by a natural exclusion restriction 
which in this case is the set of reforms that affect the decision rules for employment and child 
care use but do not enter the cognitive ability production function. Additional instruments 
(local demand conditions) are adopted and act in the same way.  
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Also in this case, a natural experiment is involved as a tool of validation of the structural 
estimations. Authors find similar results between structural estimation and IV approach using 
same instruments even if the selection bias is handled differently in the second one. 
It is interesting to note that authors list a series of previous works where problems of 
endogeneity have been handled differently, underlying how however, results seem 
inconclusive or that differ greatly between each other. They found that techniques that involve 
extensive sets of explanatory variables, fixed effects, value added models face with difficulty 
the problem of endogeneity or even not at all. Just the IV method deals well with it but, as 
authors say, using weak instrument ends up with a failure in estimation. To conclude, 
combining the power of using good instruments with a model that could deal with selection 
bias allow to obtain robust estimation. 
When the literature provides several studies on a certain subject, it would be very useful to 
compare final results, model’s formulation (a dynamic model rather than a static one, a 
binomial vs. a multinomial decision setting, and so on) assumptions (about functional forms, 
unobserved heterogeneity, individual preferences), to discuss estimation methodologies and 
obtain parameters estimates needed, for example, to calibrate the model.  
Obviously, these synergies are useful in all kind of researches, but when performing ex-
ante evaluation they are more. The goal is trying to develop a model investigating the actual 
context but also the economic theory to find the optimal estimation solution that suite the 
concrete specific case and is able to predict future scenarios. All this, having in mind the goal 
of replicability of the analysis and of the credibility of its predictive power. Modelling 
individuals behaviour in a predictive way can maybe be challenging and understand the 
optimal mix of behavioural assumptions can involve a great effort, as we have seen, that 
sometimes could reveal to be ineffective and imprecise. 
Ex-post evaluations that rely on experimental or quasi-experimental design do not really 
have to face behavioural modelling problem; their concern is observing what is happened and 
choosing the most suitable technique to analyse data and handling unobserved ones with 
consolidated techniques.  
The trade-off depends on the extent of the analysis. Ex-post analysis allow to achieve 
results that could be both internally and externally valid in a rather consolidated fashion, but it 
does not allow to explore beyond one specific question. Structural models instead, require a 
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greater effort in term of knowledges and computational burden in order to achieve some 
degree of replicability and validity, but with a notably greater analytical potential.  
This is why resolving the trade-off can be achieved through both approaches and when 
studying public interventions’ implications with structural models, it is very important to 
having a variety of examples as wide as possible available in order to resolve and simplify the 
drawbacks of the ex-ante techniques.  
An intelligent combination of all the methodologies insofar saw could, maybe, smooth out 
criticisms about policy evaluation techniques. Extrapolating the best from each approach 
allows to define a new efficient one that can answer to a wide range of policy analysis’ issues.  
Heckman (2010, 2) comparing structural models and “treatment effects” literature say: 
“The two approaches have much to learn from each other. A more active dialogue would 
benefit practitioners of both approaches. (…) A synthesis of some of the best features of both 
approaches would produce a better approach to the evaluation of social policy and of medical 
procedures”. 
1.3 COMBINING EX-POST AND EX-ANTE TECHNIQUES, AN EXAMPLE. 
(EDUCATION CHOICES IN MEXICO: USING A STRUCTURAL MODEL AND A 
RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT TO EVALUATE PROGRESA) 
Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2012) evaluate PROGRESA, evolved subsequently in 
Oportunidades, the same program implemented in Mexico and previously studied by Todd 
and Wolpin, (2010a). The aim of the paper is still the same: analyse the effects of monetary 
incentives to education choices in that country, in order to incentivize school enrolment of 
poor children. By exploiting the rich dataset provided by the randomized social experiment, 
authors show how to combine them efficiently with a structural model of education choices in 
order to make ex-ante analysis. The difference with respect to the work of Todd and Wolpin, 
(2010a) is that here Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2012) choose the way of dynamic 
structural parametric estimation. Contrary to Todd and Wolpin, (2010a) that did not exploit 
the variability induced by PROGRESA, Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2012) estimate a 
structural model identified by the variation induced by the experiment (such that it is for sure 
exogenous) using both the treatment and control group. They stress the point that the marginal 
utility of the grant is different from the marginal utility of other sources of income, like wage. 
Therefore, exploiting the variation of the opportunity cost of schooling (wage), like Todd and 
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Wolpin (2010a), may have different implications on the program’s effect estimation. 
Moreover, authors estimate the general equilibrium effects that the program could have on 
children wages. They found that the program resulted in an increase in wage in the treatment 
group by reducing labour supply of children.  
The randomized experiment’s estimation suggest an effect of the program of the type of an 
inverted U-shaped, with a small impact for children aged 0-10, a peak between 10-14 and then 
declining again.  
The model is designed as follows: each child faces two alternatives: schooling or working; 
one option precludes the other; going school envisages the grant provided by the program and 
costs affected by observable and unobservables factors. Children are allowed to go to school 
up to the age of 17, so at 18 they recover the investment, modelled by a terminal value 
function. The grant received by PROGRESA is compared with the monetary reward of going 
work.  
The reason for choosing a dynamic model is motivated by the fact that when deciding 
about enrolment, each children face each year an option to continue or drop taking into 
account the structure of the program: grants are available for the last 3 years of primary 
school and the first 3 year of secondary school. Completing primary school gives eligibility 
for receiving secondary school’s grant. Then, the terminal value function depends on the 
highest grade completed. So current decisions affect future ones; there is a state dependence 
because the number of years of school completed affects utility of attending the current one.  
Authors also test for anticipation effects, given that in some areas the implementation of 
the program is delayed, but they have not found anyone.  
A careful specification of all costs and benefits of attending school is essential: benefits 
depends on the utility of attending school, childcare services provided by the school and past 
attendance. Household entitled to PROGRESA living in treatment villages receive the grade 
and gender-specific grant. 
Costs involve buying all what it is necessary to attend school, from books to clothes and 
transportation; in addition, it is considered the opportunity cost of attending school 
represented by the lost opportunity of receiving a salary.  
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So, utility function of attending school (𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑠 ) depends on the grants received (𝑔𝑖𝑡) and on 
the remaining pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs or gains from attending school (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑠). (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑠) 
equation includes: a vector of taste shifter variables (that exclude household income since it is 
likely to be endogenous); the variable denoting attending primary or secondary school and the 
related costs; an extreme value added term i.i.d. over time and individuals, an element that 
introduces dynamics (in the sense that current schooling choices affect future grades and 
utility costs); and finally, a term representing unobservables (for the econometrician, but 
known for the individual) assumed to have constant impact over time.  
The utility function of not attending school (𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑊) depends on the potential earnings when 
out of school (𝑤𝑖𝑡) and a costs-benefits variable (𝑌𝑖𝑡
𝑊) which is a function of the same factors 
above described, a part from school attendance and related costs.  
The model includes uncertainty represented by: first, the future costs of schooling that 
since affect future schooling choices also affects the current ones and second, by the 
possibility of failure in completing a grade.  
Value functions (for schooling and working) that takes the form of a Bellman equation, are 
modelled to design the comparison between current costs of schooling and future benefits and 
costs.  
Wages represent the opportunity costs for education; since wages are not observed for 
children who do not work, and the dynamic programming requires that individual predict 
future wages, authors model a wage equation. The equation serves to test the presence of 
general equilibrium effects of the program and predictions from this equation are used in 
place of actual wages.  
Finally, the presence of past education that creates dynamic effects involve an initial 
condition problem since the econometrician is not able to observe the entire history of 
schooling of each child. Authors solve the problem specifying a reduced form for educational 
attainment up to current date.  
Exogenous variability in the data is derived from the fact that among treated villages 
families eligible are those classified as “poor”. Moreover, the grant varies by grade attended 
but in the same grade there could be children of different ages. Therefore, the effect of the 
grant is identified by comparing across treatment and control villages, eligible and ineligible 
households and different ages within and between grades.  
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The model is estimated by maximum likelihood; different versions of the model are 
estimated and results compared. First of all, authors find that the dynamic model fits the data 
well and the estimation results match those obtained in the experimental design. The program 
effectively increase enrolment rate between primary and secondary school but the impact on 
children of primary school age is not big. Authors ran also simulation to changing some 
elements of the policies; in particular, in order to improve school participation more resources 
should be offered to older children. Results suggest that given the same amount of resources 
spent, the impact on school enrolment decision of older children is larger. The conclusion 
they stated is that the program should change its structure according to different age levels.  
Authors underline how it is important to have a fully specified structural model to 
understand all the mechanisms underlying agents’ behaviour. Only by modelling so 
accurately every aspects it is possible to understand where it is necessary to intervene and 
how; simulations are then useful to understand which future policies would be optimal in term 
of costs sustained and benefits achieved.  
The evidence is that only the development of such a precise structural model produce the 
emersion of several results and considerations that are useful in order to improve the reform’s 
design and achieve more effective results.  
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2 RETURNS TO EDUCATION 
Estimating returns to education represents an area of interest in labour economics that has 
always drawn the attention because of the importance since ever conferred to the role of 
human capital in economic growth
2
.  
Education indeed, is a component of the concept of human capital, therefore several 
studies have looked for a causal effects of years and quality of education on labour market 
outcomes, estimating the “returns to education”. Two important works that left an important 
trace are those by Mincer (1974) and Griliches (1977).  
In his famous book, Mincer (1974) developed the Mincerian wage regression, the starting 
point still currently adopted in this field of analysis, to represent the existing positive 
relationship between earnings, education and experience. This gave raise to further 
discussions concerning several econometric issues as Griliches (1977) pointed out in his 
work. For instance, he addressed the problem of the “ability bias”, discussing the role of 
ability in the Mincerian equation and the way it should be properly measured and interpreted. 
Moreover, when treating the endogeneity of schooling decision, he underlined an important 
aspect that prevents the estimation of the true causal effect of education. Griliches (1977,13) 
explained that:  
“Schooling is the result, at least in part, of optimizing behaviour by individuals and their families. This 
behaviour is based on some anticipated earnings function. To the extent that the “errors” (…) in the ex-post and 
ex-ante earning functions are correlated, they will be “transmitted” to the schooling equation and induce an 
additional correlation between schooling and these disturbances.”  
This discussion paved the way to the concept of heterogeneity in returns to schooling. It is 
just since recent decades that econometricians estimating returns to education has focused, 
more than the past, on the problem of heterogeneity in returns to education. 
Card (1999, 2001) dealt with the estimation of the causal relationship between education 
and earnings in the presence of heterogeneous returns to schooling; he presented a survey of 
the literature that applies IV using institutional changes in the education system and discuss 
the discrepancies between IV and OLS estimates. The evidence is that in a wide number of 
studies the IV estimates are much higher than OLS ones. One possible explanation advanced 
                                                          
2
See Mincer (1981), Solow (1957), Barro (1992), Becker (1962, 2009), Romer (1990), Lucas (1988), Schultz 
(1961), Jorgenson and Griliches (1967), just to cite a few.  
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by Cards, relies on heterogeneity in returns. In the model he adopted, based on Becker (1967), 
individuals make their schooling choice comparing costs and benefits, maximizing the 
discounted present value of net educational earnings. Given that aptitudes and tastes towards 
schooling vary among individuals, also marginal costs and returns vary and the optimal level 
of schooling will be heterogeneous. 
He explained these findings suggesting that the marginal returns to schooling in particular 
for those individuals coming from less-wealthy backgrounds, are higher than average 
marginal returns for the population. This is deducted by the fact that IV estimates marginal 
returns only for a sub-population and is not adapt to a population level estimation. Card 
(2001, 1156) said:  
“Institutional features like compulsory schooling or the accessibility of schools are most likely to affect the 
schooling choices of individuals who would otherwise have relatively low schooling. If the main reason that 
these individuals have low schooling is because of higher-than-average costs of schooling, rather than because of 
lower-than-average returns to schooling, then "local average treatment effect" reasoning suggests that IV 
estimators based on compulsory schooling or school proximity will yield estimated returns to schooling above 
the average marginal return to schooling in the population, and potentially above the corresponding OLS 
estimates.” 
This consideration can be treated as an important starting point to discuss the most recent 
literature concerning the estimation of returns to education.  
2.1 HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS TREATMENT PARAMETERS 
Estimation of returns to education has put the focus onto managing the analysis of 
heterogeneous returns. Under this framework, conventional population level parameters and 
estimation methods could not be suitable; in this section, I introduce the development 
achieved in the literature. 
2.1.1 Estimating average effects 
The conventional population parameters estimated in the treatment literature (using the 
notation of Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007a) are: 
 ATE (j, k) = E (Y(j, ω) – Y(k, ω)) 
Where the mean effect of moving from program, state or treatment j to program, state or 
treatment k for individual ω is estimated. 
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Another conventional parameter is the Average Effect of the Treatment on the Treated 
(TT): 
 TT (j, k) = E (Y(j, ω) – Y(k, ω) | D (j, ω) = 1)  
Where D (j, ω), is the treatment status that assume value 1 if the individual receives the 
treatment, and 0 otherwise. It estimates the mean effect of moving from program, state or 
treatment j to program, state or treatment k for those individuals who get the treatment.  
Finally, in the same way, the treatment on the untreated (TUT) is defined in contrast as 
follows: 
 TUT (j, k) = E (Y (j, ω) – Y (k, ω) | D (j, ω) = 0). 
All these are “average effects”, valid at a population level. When average effects are 
constant across individuals or “homogeneous”, average and “marginal effects” are the same. 
In case of “heterogeneous treatment effects”, the opposite is true. It means that a certain 
program, policy or reform, does not allow all individuals to receive benefits of the same 
magnitude. This would be an interesting phenomenon to explore, since for example from a 
policy maker point of view, it would be useful to identify what portion of population would 
benefit of greater gains from an intervention than another one. 
Following the same line of reasoning of Card (2001), Angrist (2004) said that Instrumental 
Variable, identifies a causal effect which is internally valid for those individuals whose 
treatment status was affected by the instrument chosen. To be externally valid, the assumption 
needed is the one of homogeneity. “Basic IV assumptions identify causal effects on 
‘compliers’, defined as the subpopulation of treated individuals whose treatment status can be 
influenced by the instrument” (see Angrist, 2004, C53). This definition relates to the 
parameter introduced by Imbens and Angrist (1994), the Local Average Treatment Effect.  
2.1.2 Estimating marginal effects 
The literature concerning heterogeneous effects has been a focus of several studies; we can 
find at first the work of Heckman and Robb (1986) that considered a model of selection into 
training when the effects varies among individuals, and adopted alternative evaluation 
methods to estimate the effects of the treatment in case of non-random selection. 
Björklund and Moffitt (1987) produced one of the first work concerning returns to 
education under heterogeneous treatment effects. “One of the largest literatures in empirical 
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labor economics concerns the estimation of the determinants of the effects of various 
individual choices on wages”. (See Björklund and Moffitt, 1987, 42). In the literature many 
studies involve models of self-selection where individuals having different characteristics, 
both observables and unobservables to the researchers, internalize in their decision-process 
the knowledge and expectations they have formed about the realization of future returns, 
representing the outcome of a given educational path. This phenomenon is called indeed, 
selection on gains. Since returns are not constant across population, individuals self-select 
into the alternative that satisfy their own budget constraint. This means that the above 
described average population treatment effects do not coincide with the marginal ones.  
The work of Björklund and Moffitt (1987) introduced some concepts that have been 
widely studied in all subsequent works: Heckman and Honoré (1990) assessed the conformity 
of the Roy model to study a wide array of occupational choices. This model “(…) explain 
occupational choice and its consequences for the distribution of earnings when individuals 
differ in their endowments of occupation-specific skills”. (See Heckman and Honoré 1990, 
1121). Heckman, Smith and Clements (1997) stressed the importance of the existence of 
heterogeneity of impacts among individuals as opposed to the traditional evaluation literature 
that considers distributional issues of policy impacts as irrelevant. Finally, Heckman and 
Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) developed a rich literature that addresses and 
unifies all these aspects.  
The main concept of this branch of the literature is resumed in this sentence  (see 
Björklund and Moffitt, 1987, 42):  
“The implications of heterogeneity in rewards -or heterogeneity in the rate of return- are many and 
interesting. First, we are able to estimate not only the average wage gain to the activity of those who are 
currently participating, but also the marginal wage gain of the individuals who are on the margin (…) Second, 
we show that (…) we can distinguish the wage gain from the welfare gain to the activity”.  
Authors contributed also to the definition of the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) a 
parameter of interest that researchers want to estimate under heterogeneous treatment effects 
framework. It can be defined as the impact of the treatment on those individuals at the margin 
of indifference about participation.  
Subsequently, Heckman (2001b, 107) said: 
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 “An important distinction is the one between evaluation models where participation in the program being 
evaluated is based, at least in part, on unobserved idiosyncratic responses to treatment and models where 
participation is not based on unobserved idiosyncratic responses. This is the distinction between selection on 
unobservables and selection on observables. The validity of entire classes of evaluation estimators hinges on 
whether or not they allow agents to act on unobserved idiosyncratic responses”. 
In next section, I present technical aspects of the methodologies used to estimate marginal 
treatment effects. 
2.2 ESTIMATING MARGINAL RETURNS TO EDUCATION: AN EXAMPLE FROM 
THE LITERATURE 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) estimates the Marginal Treatment Effect  of 
college participation exploiting a local version of instrumental variable.  
The framework is characterized by self-selection and idiosyncratic returns entering the 
decisional process. Thus, marginal and average returns to schooling are ex-post not the same. 
Anyway, it is possible to recover marginal returns at different points of the margin of 
indifference. This is achieved through a local version of instrumental variable (see Heckman 
and Vytlacil 1999, 2005, 2007b). The analysis allows to study how to obtain a marginal 
expansion in college attendance induced by a variation in the available instrument that not 
necessarily has to correspond to the variation induced by the policy under consideration.  
Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) of white males in 
1979 they show that returns to college vary across individuals that act knowing their 
idiosyncratic returns to education. The MTE (Marginal Treatment Effect) is central in the 
analysis because it allows to define all the conventional parameters of interest but also others 
that answer interesting policy questions, like the Marginal Policy Relevant Treatment Effects. 
The MTE is estimated in their work using a robust semiparametric selection model and 
continuous instruments. Comparing the return (identified by these parameters) of one year 
into college with results given by OLS and IV estimators, they find that both OLS and IV 
estimation of the Average Treatment Effects are upward biased. This finding just confirms the 
evidence resulting from the literature in this field. 
Returns to schooling are conventionally measured in monetary term, thus the impact that a 
certain number of years of education has on earnings. This is what precisely estimates the 
well-known  Mincer Equation, stated as follows: 
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 𝑌𝑖 =  α + β𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
Where, 𝑌𝑖 is the log wage for individual i, 𝑆𝑖 is a dummy indicating university enrolment, β 
is the parameter of interest identifying the return to education, and 𝜀𝑖 is the residual.  
Carneiro (2003), gives a precise definition of the causes of all problems of estimation in 
the Mincer equation, analysing the sources of heterogeneity. The first problem arising in this 
regression is the correlation between 𝑆𝑖  and 𝜀𝑖, the latter interpreted typically as unobserved 
ability. This is called the “selection in levels”, the conventional source of bias considered in 
the literature, typically called “ability bias”. It can be simply solved through conventional 
methods, like Instrumental Variables. Authors found that estimating the Mincer Equation 
through conventional methods demonstrate that returns,  β, vary across individuals, thus β is 
random. It is interpreted as the percentage increase in earnings due to an additional year of 
schooling. When it is correlated with 𝑆𝑖 it give raise to the selection on returns or on gains, 
interpreted as the condition of those individuals that decide to go to school because they are 
aware of the benefits they can retrieve from schooling, thus they exploit their knowledge 
about their own idiosyncratic returns. This means that the variables that determine returns to 
education in the outcome equation are correlated with the variables entering the selection 
process.  
Analysis made at the margin of indifference allows to recover the marginal return of a 
policy that expands the individual probability of attending university, thus the return of a 
policy that induces students, that otherwise would not have enrolled, to enrol. With standard 
IV procedures instead, the risk of overestimating returns is ran, because identification 
encompasses returns also of those students that would have enrolled a priori. Indeed, under 
standard IV procedures people induced to participation by a change in the instrument could 
not be the same as those induced to participation by a policy change. Authors found that the 
two procedures give results that differ substantially, with the IV results overestimated (0.0951 
for conventional IV and 0.0148 for estimated marginal returns). This because, marginal 
expansion of university participation attracts students with lower net returns than those of 
students already enrolled. 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) estimate the MTE adopting different estimation 
procedures in order to benchmark one against the other. The normal selection model gives 
precise estimations and show that: 
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- MTE, evaluated at mean values of 𝑿, is declining in 𝑈𝑠3 meaning that people with 
highest gross returns to schooling are more likely to enrol into college, and vice versa. 
This supports the evidence that individuals self-select into the sector where they have 
a comparative advantage.  
- Range of variation of returns is (-15.6%; 28.8%) but heterogeneity can be even larger 
considering two aspects: 
o The MTE is the average gain measured at each quantile of the desire to go to 
college; 
o Accounting for variation in 𝑿, the range expands from -31.56% to 51.02%. 
The semiparametric approach results confirms these findings, even if MTE estimates 
presents larger standard errors. 
2.2.1 The model 
Starting from the standard Mincer equation (1), Heckman, Carneiro and Vytlacil (2011) 
apply the generalized Roy model
4
 where:  
 𝑌1 =  𝜇1(𝑿) + 𝑈1  and  𝑌0 =  𝜇0(𝑿) + 𝑈0 (2) 
are the potential log wages that the individual would face if he decides to attend (𝑌1) or not 
(𝑌0) college, where: 𝜇1 = 𝐸(𝑌1|𝑿 = 𝒙) and  𝜇0 = 𝐸(𝑌0|𝑿 = 𝒙). 𝑿  are observable individual 
characteristics.  
Returns to schooling, or the individual treatment effect, are identified by 
 𝑌1 − 𝑌0 =  𝛽 =  𝜇1(𝑿) − 𝜇0(𝑿) + 𝑈1 − 𝑈0. (3) 
As pointed out by Carneiro, Heckman and Vylacil (2001), when 𝑈1 − 𝑈0 ≠ 0, 𝛽 varies in 
the population.  
The average treatment effect is defined as: ?̅?(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝛽|𝑿 = 𝒙) = 𝜇1(𝒙) − 𝜇0(𝒙). 
Writing the outcome equation in potential outcome notation 
                                                          
3
  Notation is explained in next section;  𝑿 is the vector of observable individual characteristics and 𝑈𝑠 
corresponds to different quantiles of the unobserved component of the index of the desire to go to college.    
4
 See Heckman and Vytlacil (2007b). 
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 𝑌 =  𝑆𝑌1+(1-S)𝑌0 (4) 
And substituting equation (2) in (4), we obtain: 
 𝑌 =  𝜇0(𝑿) + 𝑆(𝜇1(𝑿) − 𝜇0(𝑿)) + 𝑈0 + 𝑆(𝑈1 − 𝑈0) (5) 
Where ?̅?(𝑥) = 𝜇1(𝒙) − 𝜇0(𝒙), therefore, 
 𝑌 =  𝜇0(𝑿) + 𝑆?̅?(𝑥) + 𝑈0 + 𝑆(𝑈1 − 𝑈0) (6) 
Since participation into the program is voluntary, it is necessary to define the decision rule. 
To do so, a standard latent variable discrete choice model is adopted, where the individual’s 
net benefit of college attendance is given by: 
 𝐼𝑠 =  𝜇𝑠(𝒁) − 𝑉 (7) 
𝑆   is the dummy variable indicating college enrolment, 𝒁  is a vector of observable 
variables and 𝑉 unobservables to the econometrician. 𝐼 is a latent endogenous variable and 
𝑆=1 if 𝐼𝑠 ≥ 0 and 𝑆=0 otherwise.  
Assumptions stated are: 
i. 𝑉 is a continuous random variable with a strictly increasing distribution function 𝐹𝑉; it 
may depends on (𝑈1,𝑈0) in a general way. 
ii. 𝒁 may include some or all components of 𝑿 plus some variables excluded from it (the 
exclusion restriction). 
iii. (𝑈1, 𝑈0, 𝑉) is statistically independent of 𝒁 given 𝑿. 
iv. (𝑈1, 𝑈0, 𝑉) is statistically independent of 𝑿. 
v. 𝜇𝑠(𝒁) is a non degenerate random variable conditional on 𝑿 (existence of a valid 
instrument). 
vi. 𝑌1 and 𝑌0 have finite first moments (in order to define mean parameters). 
vii. 1 > Pr(𝑆 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥) > 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝 (𝑋) , this is required in order to 
assure the existence of treated and controls.  
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Monotonicity in 𝒁 is also required, in the sense that given certain values of an instrument, 
𝑧 and 𝑧′, 𝑆(𝑧) ≥ 𝑆(𝑧′) for all individuals, or 𝑆(𝑧′) ≥ 𝑆(𝑧) for all individuals, meaning that a 
certain instrument either induces individuals into schooling or not.  
The probability of attending college (the propensity score) is defined like:  𝑃(𝒛) ≡
Pr(𝑆 = 1| 𝒁 = 𝒛) = 𝐹𝑉(𝜇𝑠(𝒛)), (conditioning on 𝑿 left implicit). 
Under these assumptions, Vytlacil (2002) establishes that the model presented is equivalent 
to the LATE model of Imbens and Angrist (1994) under Index Sufficiency, that involves that 
𝒁 enters the conditional expectation only through 𝑃(𝒛).  
The Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) is given by: 
 MTE (x, 𝑢𝑠) ≡ 𝐸(𝛽|𝑿 = 𝒙, 𝑈𝑠 =  𝑢𝑠) (8) 
With 𝑈𝑠 =  𝐹𝑉(𝑉) , uniformly distributed, where different value of 𝑈𝑠  corresponds to 
different quantiles of 𝑉 . Therefore, if 𝑆 = 1, 𝑃(𝒛) ≥ 𝑈𝑠. Representing MTE over different 
values of 𝑈𝑠, permits to see how “(…) returns vary with different quantiles of the unobserved 
component of the index of the desire to go to college” (see Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 
2011, 2756). If the MTE does not depend on 𝑢𝑠, marginal and average returns are ex-post the 
same, so the parameter identified would be ?̅?(𝑥), the average treatment effects.  
The MTE is the mean return to schooling for individuals with characteristics 𝑿 = 𝒙 and 
𝑈𝑠 =  𝑢𝑠, so for an individual indifferent between going or not to college, whose 𝑃(𝒛) = 𝑈𝑠. 
Equation (8) tells us that MTE is “the expected treatment effect conditional on the 
unobservables that determines participation” (see Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil 2010, 379). 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil 2001, establish that the MTE is the limit of LATE when it 
exists.  
2.2.2 The Local Instrumental Variable estimator (LIV) 
The MTE can be estimated through the method of Local Instrumental Variable, by 
differentiating 𝐸(𝑌|𝑿 = 𝒙,   𝑃(𝒁) = 𝑝) with respect to p5, where, (leave the conditioning on 
𝑿 implicit): 
                                                          
5
 The importance of having continuous instruments is evident when computing this derivative; continuous 
instruments involve a continuous 𝑃, required to do this calculation. 
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 𝐸(𝑌|𝑃(𝒁) = 𝑝)  =  𝜇0 + ?̅?𝑝 + 𝐸(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑆 = 1, 𝑃 = 𝑝)𝑝 
=  𝜇0 + ?̅?𝑝 + 𝐸(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑃 ≥ 𝑈𝑠, 𝑃 = 𝑝)𝑝 
= 𝜇0 + ?̅?𝑝 + ∫ 𝐸
𝑝
0
(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠)𝑑𝑢𝑠 (8) 
Where 𝐸(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑃 > 𝑈𝑠, 𝑃 = 𝑝)𝑝  is a control function involved in selection on 
unobservables analysis, and  
 𝜕𝐸(𝑌|𝑃(𝒁) = 𝑝) 𝜕𝑝⁄  = ?̅? + 𝐸(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑈𝑠 = 𝑝) (9) 
Therefore,  
 MTE (x, p) = ?̅? + 𝐸(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑈𝑠 =  𝑝) (10) 
is the Local Instrumental Variable Estimator (LIV) of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999).  
A simple graphical observation of this derivative allows to understand the magnitude of the 
heterogeneity. A flat derivative indicates that the heterogeneity has little impact in the 
evaluation, whereas nonlinearity indicates that there is selection on unobservables. Since 
typically standard IV impose linearity in 𝑃, IV would be a valid estimator only in absence of 
selection on unobservables.  
Indeed, estimating equation (6) with standard IV poses some problems; an instrument is 
valid if it affects the endogenous regressor and is not correlated with the error term in the 
outcome equation. From (6) 
 𝑌 =  𝜇0(𝑿) + 𝑆?̅?(𝑥) + 𝑈0 + 𝑆(𝑈1 − 𝑈0) (6) 
It is clear that: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚 ?̂?𝐼𝑉 =
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑌)
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑆)
= ?̅? +
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑈0)
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑆)
+
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑆(𝑈1 − 𝑈0))
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑆)
 
even if 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑈0) is = 0, 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑆(𝑈1 − 𝑈0)) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑍, 𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑆 = 1)𝑃, therefore the 
last term is not equal to zero because 𝑈1 − 𝑈0 is dependent on 𝑆.  
Linear instrumental variable is typically used when the goal is that of estimating the 
average returns to schooling, 𝛽. Under selection in levels, this method allows to estimate the 
average returns of schooling, either if 𝛽 is constant or a random variable, but not correlated 
with 𝑆. 
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Things change under heterogeneity, when 𝛽 is not only a random variable, but is also 
correlated with 𝑆 . Under these circumstances is not possible to identify a parameter that 
averages out the distribution of returns. 
Carneiro (2003, 4) says “(…) I find that the average person going to college has a higher 
return from the marginal person who is indifferent between enrolling in college or not. This 
suggests that heterogeneity is important and needs to be accounted for in policy analysis”. 
?̂?𝐼𝑉, estimated using 𝑃(𝒁) as an instrument can be derived from a weighted average of the 
MTE (see Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001). Moreover, all other parameters of interest 
can be retrieved in this fashion, as it is explained in next section.  
Given the empirical support of 𝑃(𝒁) (conditional on 𝑿), it is possible through the MTE to 
estimate the return to schooling for an individual indifferent between enrolling or not at all 
points of the margin of indifference, identified by unobservable factors entering the net 
benefit function. In other words, it is possible to identify the returns of a particular individual, 
identified by the quantile of the unobserved component of the desire to go to college (𝑈𝑠), 
induced to go to college by a marginal change in 𝑃(𝒁). By aggregating all instruments in 
𝑃(𝒁), it is possible to enlarge the support over which MTE can be estimated.  
This method avoids problems that arise when estimating LATE in case of multiple 
instruments; estimating LATE in case of selection on gains using multiple instruments is 
typically achieved through varying one instrument at a time; anyway, this procedure needs to 
account for the covariation of each instruments with the others. Adopting 𝑃(𝒁), it is possible 
to identify the contribution of each instrument in tracing out various regions of MTE function.  
From (10), you can understand that an individual at the margin is an individual for which 
the net benefit function is null; those with an high value of 𝑈𝑠  have therefore also an high 
value of 𝑃(𝒁), for which(𝑈𝑠 =  𝑝). In order to induce him or her participating, it is needed 
that instruments assume certain values that makes the p-score through a marginal increase 
higher than  𝑈𝑠. Instead, those individuals with low value of 𝑈𝑠, with 𝑃(𝒁) higher than 𝑈𝑠, 
face a positive net benefit function, thus are already enrolled; for these individuals, marginal 
increase in 𝑃(𝒁) is worthless.  
Once the MTE is estimated, Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) can retrieve 
parameters like the average return to college in the population, the average return to college 
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for students enrolled and also the standard IV estimator, just by creating weighted averages of 
the MTE
6
. 
The general formula that allows to identify all parameters of interest starting from the MTE 
is the following: 
 Parameter j= ∫ 𝑀𝑇𝐸
1
0
(𝑥, 𝑢𝑠)𝜔𝑗(𝑥, 𝑢𝑠)𝑑𝑢𝑠 , given 𝑥 (11) 
 
2.2.3 Policy Relevant Treatment Effects and Marginal Policy Relevant Treatment 
Effects 
Another parameter of interest is the Policy Relevant Treatment Effect (PRTE). 
Once the MTE is identified, the optimal policy that induces individuals at the margin of 
indifference to enrol can be identified. How? Authors choose a class of policies that modifies 
the probability of participation (p-score). An exclusion restriction is needed, indeed Carneiro 
(2003), sets the conditions needed to evaluate the policy relevant effect; the policy under 
investigation has to affect only the selection equation in order to rules out general equilibrium 
effects (this is the standard requirement stated in all structural models as already presented in 
Chapter 1); then, the policy has to operate only through one of the instruments selected, 
changing their values inside the support of the data. In the estimation of education’s returns 
typically, policies under consideration satisfying these conditions can be the change in tuition 
or distance to college. For example, Carneiro (2003), estimates the effect of subsidizing 
tuition in a fixed amount considering individuals that decide to enroll only if the subsidy is in 
place. The way in which this is modelled is the same already seen in other structural choice 
models (see Todd and Wolpin, 2010). The effect of a subsidy is equal to the reduction of 
tuition by a fix amount, e.g.  𝑍 − 𝛼 . Other subsidy schemes can be estimated too, like 
proportional tax reduction. 
The formula is derived as follows; (keeping conditioning on 𝑿  implicit in all that follows) 
starting from a Baseline Policy, the aim is calculating the mean effect for a person 
experiencing a change of a policy that influences its probability of participation into a certain 
program. Define 𝑆∗ as the treatment status under the Alternative Policy, 𝑌∗ as the outcome 
under the Alternative Policy, then if 𝐸(𝑆) ≠ 𝐸(𝑆∗),   
                                                          
6
See Heckman and  Vytlacil (2005) Table IB 
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 PRTE = 
𝐸(𝑌∗|𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦)−𝐸(𝑌|𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦)
𝐸(𝑆∗|𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦)−𝐸(𝑆|𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦)
= ∫ 𝑀𝑇𝐸
1
0
(𝑢𝑠)𝜔𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐸(𝑢𝑠)𝑑𝑢𝑠 (12) 
where, 𝜔𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐸(𝑢𝑠) are the policy weights that depend on the distribution of 𝑃
∗ and  𝑃, the 
p-score under the alternative and baseline policy respectively. Therefore, this parameter 
identifies the average return for an individual that decide to enroll because the policy is in 
place but that would not enroll otherwise.  
The PRTE depends only on the distribution of 𝑃∗,which is the probability of participation 
after the policy change. PRTE function links the distribution of 𝑃∗  to the individual-
outcome’s change.  
The limitation of this method is that the PRTE can be difficult to identified because it 
requires that the support of  𝑃(𝒁) is the full unit interval, and it is not always the case. Indeed, 
as explained in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010, 386), “(…) suppose that the largest 
estimated probability of attending college is strictly less than 1. For analysing a tuition 
subsidy policy, it is possible that the largest probability of attending college under a tuition 
subsidy will be greater than the largest probability of attending college without a tuition 
subsidy, so the support condition for identifying the corresponding PRTE parameter is 
violated”. 
The evolution of the PRTE that requires only a weaker condition, is the marginal version 
of the PRTE: the Marginal Policy Relevant Treatment Effect (MPRTE), that identifies the 
marginal change from a baseline policy. It requires weaker assumptions because it only needs 
that the MTE is estimated within the support of the data, therefore the full unit support of 
𝑃(𝒁) is not required. MPRTE is derived placing positive weights on the MTE (x, 𝑢𝑠), for 
those values of 𝑢𝑠 where the density of 𝑃(𝒁) is positive. Thus, identifying MPRTE is still 
possible even if PRTE is not. Moreover, the MPRTE is a parameter useful in conducting cost-
benefit analysis of marginal policy changes.  
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010) specify all the conditions required to estimate the 
MPRTE. In particular, they say that “the essential requirement is availability of a continuous 
instrument”. This means that the necessary assumption is that 𝒁  contains a continuous 
variable, thus a continuous instrument for the treatment status variable. Under this condition, 
marginal policy changes can be analyzed and marginal policy treatment effects evaluated. The 
whole analysis is still conducted conditional on X. 
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Using sequences of PRTEs it is possible to define a marginal version of this parameter of 
interest. Following Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010, 2011), the MPRTE can be derived 
as follows. 
Start by considering a baseline policy, for which the baseline probability that 𝐷 = 1 is 
𝑃0 = 𝑃(𝒁). 
Now take a sequence of policies indexed by a scalar variable α, with α=0 the baseline 
policy. Then, Pα is the corresponding probability of schooling, whose associated cumulative 
distribution function is denoted by Fα. 
Next, for each policy α, define the corresponding PRTE parameter. The corresponding 
MPRTE parameter is the limit of the sequence of PRTEs as α goes to zero. An example that 
relates to following chapters, is a policy that affects tuition fees. If the kth elements of 𝒁 is 
college tuition, and the policy subsidizes college tuition for example with grants, by a certain 
amount α, you will have Zα
k 
= Z
k 
+ α and Zα
j
= Z
j
 for j≠k. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2011) estimate the MPRTE for policies concerning marginal change in tuitions and marginal 
changes in 𝑃. 
Therefore, MPRTE is derived as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐸({𝐹𝛼}) =  lim
𝜏→0
𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐸(𝐹𝜏) =  ∫ 𝑀𝑇𝐸
1
0
(𝑢𝑠)𝜔𝑀𝑃𝑅𝑇𝐸(𝑢𝑠; {𝐹𝛼})𝑑𝑢𝑠 (13) 
A practical issue in the estimation of the MPRTE concerns how to deal with the 
conditioning set of observed variables 𝑿. Following Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010), 
if the conditioning set contains only discrete elements the nonparametric estimation is still 
possible; however, as noted in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) by imposing stronger 
assumptions, specifically invoking parametric assumptions on the joint distribution of the 
unobservables and independence between unobservables and (𝑿, 𝒁), it is possible to identify 
the MTE over the unconditional support of P, not on the support of P conditional on 𝑿. 
An interesting objective that can be achieved through evaluation of public policy is 
performing a cost-benefit analysis. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2010, 2011) state that 
the parameter of interest in this sense is the MPRTE. In particular, they link this parameter to 
the Average Marginal Treatment Effect (AMTE), defined as: “the average effect of treatment 
for the marginal person who is indifferent between participation and non participation”. Cost-
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benefit analysis can be achieved comparing average marginal returns to average marginal 
costs of policy implementation. 
AMTE relies on a certain metric; it considers individuals who are arbitrarily close to the 
margin of indifference, so it takes into account a measure of distance between 𝑃(𝒁) and 𝑈𝑠 
that identifies the indifference set.  
Given a certain metric 𝑚(𝑃, 𝑈𝑠), the AMTE is defined as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑀𝑇𝐸 = lim
𝑒→0
𝐸[𝑌1 − 𝑌0|𝑚(𝑃, 𝑈𝑠) ≤ 𝑒] = ∫ 𝑀𝑇𝐸
1
0
(𝑢𝑠)𝜔𝐴𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑢𝑠)𝑑𝑢𝑠 (14) 
Where weights, 𝜔𝐴𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑢𝑠), depends on the metric chosen. 
Both MPRTE and LATE estimate marginal effects; LATE “measures the mean gross 
return to treatment for individuals induced into treatment by a change in an instrument”. It 
estimates “the mean return at the margin defined by manipulation of the instrument”. (see 
Heckman, 2010, 15). Anyway the substantial difference is that in the case of LATE the 
instrument variation has to correspond exactly to the policy variation and different 
instruments produces different estimates (e.g. exploiting variation over an instrument like 
distance to college does not produce the same estimate that would be obtained exploiting the 
variation in tuitions). Moreover, the LATE approach does not require the specification of a 
choice equation. This means that it is not possible to identify the margin of choice traced out 
by variation in instruments. 
2.3 ESTIMATION’S PROCEDURE OF MTE AND MARGINAL POLICY EFFECTS 
Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) specify different estimation alternatives to derive the 
parameters of interest presented in the previous paragraph. In particular, the first step consist 
in the estimation of the propensity score; this is done by adopting a Probit model by authors, 
but other techniques can be adopted (e.g. the Logit model as in Carneiro, Heckman and 
Vytlacil, 2011). 
The main point concerns the second step, that is the estimation of the MTE. Methods 
explained by Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) can be pooled in two main categories: the 
parametric and the semiparametric approach of structural models; within each category, they 
specify two procedures, as listed below: 
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 The parametric approach: 
o Under normality assumption; 
o Relaxing normality assumption (using a polynomial for the propensity score); 
 The semiparametric approach: 
o The LIV estimator; 
o Semiparametric approach with more structure (mixing polynomial 
approximation method and LIV). 
Reconnecting to the model of Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, (2011) previously 
discussed, they adopt a Normal Selection Model for what concerns the parametric estimation, 
and the LIV estimator afterwards, which is the main focus of their work. Under the first 
procedure, more structure is required with respect to the LIV estimator approach. In 
particular, the main parametric assumption invoked is that the joint distribution of (𝑈0, 𝑈1, 𝑉) 
is normally distributed and independent of (𝑿, 𝒁) . Under this assumption, the outcome 
equation is estimated through Maximum Likelihood estimator. Authors argue that the 
parametric estimation is less flexible but more precise than the semiparametric one. 
Nevertheless, since normality is a strong assumptions, the results produced under this method 
are compared with that of the semiparametric approach. 
In what follows, I discuss first the parametric approach and then the semiparametric one.  
2.3.1 Sample Selection Model 
The Sample Selection Model of Heckman was developed in Heckman (1979). In this 
section I discuss this topic, providing details and development of this method.  
Heckman developed the model in order to estimate behavioural functions in case of 
“omitted variable” bias. This bias results from non-random selection of sample, therefore is 
also called sample selection bias. When non-random selection arises from individuals’ self-
selection into treatment we talk about self-selection bias. Heckman (1979) developed this 
model to deal with cases of limited dependent variable. To explain this, consider for example 
a wage equation; when estimating it, it is possible to observe earnings only for a certain 
subgroup of the population, which is not randomly selected, but has self-selected on the base 
of some unobserved factors. 
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This model is particularly important in the heterogeneous treatment effect literature, 
because it has put the basis for the development of the estimation procedures needed for the 
identification of the MTE. What is particular important in the estimation of the MTE using 
parametric or semiparametric approach instead of IV approach, is that we are able to precisely 
specify the margin of indifference.  
Heckman’s Nobel Lecture contributed to the further developments in the identification of 
the parameters of interests considered in policy evaluation. Heckman (1979) presented his 
techniques modelling labour supply to identify the determinants of wages of working women.  
For what concerns returns to schooling, through  a structural model as the Generalized Roy 
model, it is possible to model both the outcome and choice equations as it has been explained 
in section 3.2.1. In particular, modelling schooling choice is important given endogeneity of 
the dummy variable indicating schooling status; here the selection bias arises because some 
determinants of the schooling choice equation affects the wage equation. 
Heckman sample selection model relies on the use of the Inverse Mill’s Ratio (see 
Heckman, 1979 for more details). It is implemented in the famous Heckman two-step 
estimator to estimate the outcome regression.  
The sample selection model involves two equations, the outcome and the selection 
equation. In case of returns to education, the selection equation indicates that we are 
observing wages of graduates only if the selection equation is positive. This equation tells us 
how the selection process works. 
Indeed, in the original sample selection model of Heckman, the selection equation defines 
that you can observe the dependent variable in the outcome equation only if the selection 
equation is above a certain threshold, e.g. is positive. For those individuals not selected into 
program/treatment/status you cannot observe the counterfactual. Therefore, the dependent 
variable in the outcome equation is incidental truncated, that means that it is the result of a 
sample selection mechanism
7
.  
Now I present the main features of the sample selection model; this allow to understand the 
estimation procedures that are useful to our analysis.  
Following Greene (2005) and Vella (1998), the sample selection model is structured as 
follows: 
                                                          
7
 For more details about truncation and censoring see Greene (2005) and Heckman (1979). 
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 𝑦𝑖
∗ = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜀𝑖; 𝑖 = 1, … , N (i) 
 𝑑𝑖
∗ = 𝒛𝒊
′𝜸 + 𝑣𝑖; 𝑖 = 1, … , N (ii) 
 𝑑𝑖 = 1(𝑑𝑖
∗ > 0) (iii) 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖
∗ ∗ 𝑑𝑖 (iv) 
 
𝑦𝑖
∗ is the latent endogenous variable, whose counterpart is 𝑦𝑖 which can be observed only if 
𝑑𝑖 = 1 ;𝑑𝑖
∗  is the latent variable indicating the sample selection. 𝒙𝒊
′  and 𝒛𝒊
′ are vectors of 
exogenous variables and the exclusion restriction is that 𝒛𝒊
′ contains at least one element not 
contained in 𝒙𝒊
′; 𝜷  and 𝜸  are vectors of unknown parameters. 𝜀𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are zero mean error 
terms and have nonzero correlation. The entire sample is made of N individuals and n is the 
number of individuals for which 𝑑𝑖 = 1.  
The standard assumption [A1] tells that, the error terms (𝜀𝑖 ,𝑣𝑖) are bivariate normally 
distributed with correlation 𝜌[(𝜀𝑖,𝑣𝑖)~𝑁(0,0,1, 𝜎𝜀 , 𝜌)] and they are independent of 𝒛𝒊
′. 
Under this assumption it follows that:  
 𝐸[𝑦𝑖
∗|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖
∗ > 0] = 𝐸[𝑦𝑖
∗|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 1] 
= 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝑑𝑖 = 1] 
= 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝑣𝑖 > −𝒛𝒊
′𝜸] (v) 
Since (𝜀𝑖,𝑣𝑖) are bivariate normally distributed, we can know the truncated joint density 
given the truncated normal distribution formula from Greene (2003, 757). Given a continuous 
random variable x with pdf f(x) and be a  a constant, the density of the truncated random 
variable is: 
𝑓(𝑥|𝑥 > 𝑎) =
𝑓(𝑥)
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥 > 𝑎)
 
If 𝑥 is normally distributed with mean μ and variance 𝜎, 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥 > 𝑎) = 1 − Φ(
a−μ
𝜎
), with 
Φ(∙)  the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Therefore the density of the 
truncated normal distribution is: 
𝑓(𝑥|𝑥 > 𝑎) =
𝑓(𝑥)
1 − Φ(
a − μ
𝜎 )
 
44 
 
 
 
Given a random variable with a truncated normal distribution, the truncated mean is: 
𝐸(𝑥|𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = 𝜇 + 𝜎𝜆(𝛼) 
With 𝛼 =
a−μ
𝜎
; 𝜆(𝛼) is the so called Inverse Mills Ratio, equal to: 
 𝜙(𝛼)/[1 − Φ(𝛼)] if truncation is 𝑥 > 𝑎; 
 −𝜙(𝛼)/Φ(𝛼) if truncation is 𝑥 < 𝑎. 
Where 𝜙(∙)  and Φ(∙)  are respectively the probability density and the cumulative 
distribution function of the standard normal distribution.  
Considering these formulas, Greene (2003), defines the moments of the Incidentally 
Truncated Bivariate Normal Distribution; if y and z have a bivariate normal distribution, with 
mean 𝜇𝑦  , 𝜇𝑧 , standard deviation 𝜎𝑦  , 𝜎𝑧 and correlation 𝜌, the truncated mean is: 
𝐸(𝑦|𝑧 > 𝑎) = 𝜇𝑦, + 𝜌𝜎𝑦 𝜆(𝛼𝑧) 
With 𝛼𝑧 =
a−𝜇𝑧 
𝜎𝑧 
 , and 𝜆(𝛼𝑧) =  𝜙(𝛼𝑧)/[1 − Φ(𝛼𝑧)]. 
Therefore, given the properties of the incidentally truncated distribution and in particular 
from the truncated mean formula, it follows that equation (v) can be written as: 
 𝐸[𝑦𝑖
∗|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 1] = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜌𝜎𝜀 𝜙(−𝒛𝒊
′𝜸)/[1 − Φ(−𝒛𝒊
′𝜸)] 
= 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜌𝜎𝜀 𝜆(−𝒛𝒊
′𝜸) (vi) 
From (vi) is clear that the least square regression of  𝑦𝑖 on 𝒙𝒊
′ in the observed data cannot 
allow to consistently estimate 𝜷, this because of the second term in the right hand side of (vi) 
which is different from zero (𝜌𝜎𝜀 ≠ 0 for assumption) and because the inverse Mills ratio 𝜆(-
𝒛𝒊
′𝜸) is correlated with 𝒙𝒊
′ in particular if the two vectors 𝒙𝒊
′ and  𝒛𝒊
′ contain common variables. 
Only introducing a term that accounts for 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝑑𝑖 = 1] ≠ 0 , it is possible to obtain a 
consistent estimate, otherwise one would incur in the specification error of an omitted 
variable problem. 
An interesting extension of this model consists in the Treatment Effect Model, that is 
particularly interesting for the analysis presented in this dissertation and represents the setting 
shown in the paper by Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011).  
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2.3.2 Endogenous Treatment Effect Model 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝛿𝑑𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖; 𝑖 = 1, … , N (vii) 
 𝑑𝑖
∗ = 𝒛𝒊
′𝜸 + 𝑣𝑖; 𝑖 = 1, … , N (viii) 
 𝑑𝑖 = 1(𝑑𝑖
∗ > 0) (ix) 
This model indeed has been widely applied in the literature to study returns to education. 
Therefore, as shown in Greene (2003) consider equation (vii) as the earning equation and 
equation (viii) the program participation equation indicating whether the individual attends 
college or not. Since the framework is that of selection on gains, estimating equation (vii) 
with conventional methods like OLS would produce a biased estimate; indeed individuals 
who self-select into college are the ones with higher returns. Since 𝜷  differs across 
individuals and it is in general found to be different from the average 𝜷 for the population, 
?̅?, then the sorting gain is defined as 𝐸[𝜷 -?̅?|𝑆 = 1]. 
When the sorting gain exists, the relation between the most known parameters estimated is 
TT>ATE>TUT, because those who decide to select into schooling are those who retrieve an 
higher returns from it. 
Since 𝑣𝑖and 𝜀𝑖 are correlated, keeping the same assumption [A1] of the sample selection 
model, and keeping in mind equation (vi), the estimation turns to be: 
 𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 1] = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝛿 + 𝜌𝜎𝜀 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 1] 
= 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝛿 + 𝜌𝜎𝜀 𝜆(-𝒛𝒊
′𝜸) (x) 
Then, by symmetry of the normal distribution, 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 0] = 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝑣𝑖 < −𝒛𝒊
′𝜸] =
𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝑣𝑖 > 𝒛𝒊
′𝜸] =  𝜙(𝒛𝒊
′𝜸)/[1 − Φ(𝒛𝒊
′𝜸)]; so, for individuals that do not select into treatment, 
 𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 0] = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 − 𝜌𝜎𝜀 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 0] 
= 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 − 𝜌𝜎𝜀 𝜆(𝒛𝒊
′𝜸) (xi) 
Consequently, the average treatment effect is: 
 𝐸[𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 1] − [𝑦𝑖|𝒙𝒊
′, 𝑑𝑖 = 0] = 𝛿 + 𝜌𝜎𝜀 
𝜙𝑖
Φ𝑖[1 − Φ𝑖]
⁄  
(xii) 
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From (xii) it is clear that by simply estimating (vii) by OLS omitting 𝜌𝜎𝜀 
𝜙𝑖
Φ𝑖[1 − Φ𝑖]
⁄  
produce a biased estimate of the true treatment effect. 
2.3.3 Parametric estimation  
The normal sample selection model and its extension as treatment effect model, can 
traditionally be estimated in two ways: 
 Through the two-step estimator of Heckman (1979); 
 Through Maximum Likelihood.  
2.3.3.1 The two step estimator 
The two- step estimator for the sample selection model involves: 
- A first step in which a binary Probit model is applied to estimate the selection 
equation through maximum likelihood; this allow to estimate  𝜸. Since 𝒛𝒊
′ is observed, 
using ?̂?, it is possible to obtain an estimation of the inverse Mills ratio  𝜆𝑖, therefore ?̂?𝑖. 
- The second step consists in the least square regression of 𝑦𝑖 on 𝒙𝒊
′ and the additional 
term  ?̂?𝑖 .this regression takes the form of: 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜇?̂?𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 (xiii) 
With 𝜇 = 𝜌𝜎𝜀, and 𝜂𝑖 a generic zero mean error uncorrelated with the regressor. 
This method is also called control function estimator. 
Given the formula of the variance of the incidentally truncated bivariate normal 
distribution (see Greene, 2003, 781): 
𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝜎𝜀
2(1 − 𝜌2𝛿𝑖), 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝛿𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖(𝜆𝑖 − 𝒛𝒊
′𝜸) 
It is possible to estimate all the parameters of the model.
8
 
Finally, a t-test for 𝜇 = 0 is a test for the sample selectivity bias. 
In case of the endogenous treatment effect model, equation (xiii) becomes: 
                                                          
8
Greene (2003, 2005) demonstrated that the covariance matrix for least square estimator as it is conventionally 
estimated is inappropriate in this model, anyway, Heckman (1979) provided the appropriately correction. 
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 𝑦𝑖 = 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷 + 𝜃𝑑𝑖 + 𝜇?̂?𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 (xiii) 
And the first step leads to obtain a Probit residual (estimation of 𝜆𝑖 using ?̂?), that is called 
the generalized residual from the Probit model and takes the form of: 
 ?̂?𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 ∗
𝜙(𝒛𝒊
′?̂?)
Φ(𝒛𝒊
′?̂?)
+ (1 − 𝑑𝑖)
−𝜙(−𝒛𝒊
′?̂?)
Φ(−𝒛𝒊
′?̂?)
 
(xiv) 
From Vella (1998, 136), important properties of this residual are stated:  
“First, it has mean zero over the whole sample. Second, it is uncorrelated with the variables that appears as 
explanatory variables in the first step Probit model. (…) This model is identified without exclusion restrictions 
due to the nonlinearity of the residual. Also note that the generalized residual is uncorrelated with the 𝒛𝒊
′𝑠, over 
the whole sample, by construction. Thus the consequences of high degree of collinearity between the generalized 
residual and the  𝒛𝒊
′𝑠, which is a concern in the sample selection model, does not arise”. 
The two-step estimator has also been revised in the literature in order to accommodate 
criticism about the strong distributional assumption imposed. Therefore, as explained in Vella 
(1998) and Greene (2003), alternative methods like the Semi-parametric two-step estimation 
has been investigated. See also Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) that suggest the adoption 
of a parametric approach using a polynomial approximation for the propensity score to 
estimate the marginal treatment effect under heterogeneity conditions.  
2.3.3.2 The Maximum Likelihood estimator 
Under assumption [A1] the average log likelihood function to maximize is: 
 
𝐿 =
1
𝑁
∑ {𝑑𝑖 ∗ 𝑙𝑛 [∫ 𝜙𝜀𝜈(𝑦𝑖 − 𝒙𝒊
′𝜷, 𝑣)𝑑𝑣
∞
−𝒛𝒊
′𝜸
] + (1 − 𝑑𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
∗ [𝑙𝑛 ∫ ∫ 𝜙𝜀𝜈(𝜀, 𝑣)𝑑𝜀𝑑𝑣
∞
−∞
∞
−𝒛𝒊
′𝜸
]} 
(xv) 
With  𝜙𝜀𝜈 the probability density function of the bivariate normal distribution. 
From Vella (1998), “when the model is estimated by maximum likelihood the parameter 
estimates are fully efficient”. Also in this case, there have been various attempts in the 
literature to estimate under ML relaxing normality assumption; see the discussion in Vella 
(1998) for more details.  
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Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) estimate the normal selection model through 
Maximum Likelihood. Under the assumption that the joint distribution of (𝑈0, 𝑈1, 𝑉)  is 
normally distributed and independent of (𝑿, 𝒁) with the variance of 𝑉normalized to 1, they 
adopt a linear-in-the-parameter model, assuming separability between 𝑿 and (𝑈0, 𝑈1), with 
equations (2) and (7) becoming: 
 𝑌1 =  𝛿1𝑿 + 𝑈1 and  𝑌0 =  𝛿0𝑿 + 𝑈0 (2’) 
 𝐼𝑠 =  𝛾𝒁 − 𝑉 (7’) 
Therefore, writing equation (2’) with potential outcome notation, we obtain: 
 𝑌 = 𝛿0𝒙 + 𝑆𝒙(𝛿1 − 𝛿0) + 𝑈0 + 𝑆(𝑈1 − 𝑈0) (5’) 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytacil (2003), show that combining the model for 𝑆 with the 
model for 𝑌 implies a partially linear model for the conditional expectation of 𝑌: 
 𝐸(𝑌|𝑿 = 𝒙,   𝑃(𝒁)) = 𝛿0𝒙 + 𝑃(𝒁)𝒙(𝛿1 − 𝛿0) +  𝐾(𝑃(𝒁)) (8’) 
Where 𝐾(𝑃(𝒁)) = 𝐸(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑃(𝒁), 𝑆 = 1)𝑃(𝒁) = 𝐸(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|Φ(𝑈𝑠) ≤ 𝑃(𝒁)𝑃(𝒁), and 
(𝛿1 − 𝛿0)  is the coefficient of the interaction between 𝑃(𝒁) and 𝒙. In Carneiro, Heckman and 
Vytlacil (2003) testing the linearity of this equation is a way to test for selection on the 
individual returns to attending college; Nonlinearity in 𝑃 means that there is heterogeneity in 
the returns to college attendance and selection on gains  (conditional on 𝑿).  
Deriving (8’) with respect to p, we are able to estimate the marginal treatment effect. 
 MTE (𝐱, 𝑢𝑠) = 𝒙(𝛿1 − 𝛿0) + E(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑈𝑠 =  𝑢𝑠) 
= 𝒙(𝛿1 − 𝛿0) + E(𝑈1 − 𝑈0|𝑉 =  Φ
−1(𝑢𝑠)) 
                        = 𝒙(𝛿1 − 𝛿0) − (𝜎1𝑉 − 𝜎0𝑉) Φ
−1(𝑢𝑠) (10’) 
With, Φ−1(∙) the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. A test 
for heterogeneous effects require to test if the slope of the MTE is equal to zero, which means, 
testing if (𝜎1𝑉 − 𝜎0𝑉) = 0. 
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2.3.4 The LIV estimator 
The innovation of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) allows to exploit a semiparametric 
estimation of the parameters of interest that overcomes the concerns raised up about the 
strong parametric assumptions required in the previously seen approach. As explained in 
Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001, 3) “The contrast often made in the empirical literature 
between IV and selection models is a false one. Recently developed IV methods are special 
cases of nonparametric selection models”. 
Start by estimating 𝑃(𝒁) through Probit or Logit regression, as we have seen before. This 
step allows to identify the support of 𝑃(𝒁) on which MTE will be estimated. Depending on 
the underlying assumptions, it will vary. Indeed, assuming that (𝑈0, 𝑈1, 𝑉) is independent of 
𝒁 given  𝑿, Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2011) show that the support of the propensity 
score shrinks with respect to the full unit interval
9
. Whereas, invoking the stronger 
assumption for which (𝑈0, 𝑈1, 𝑉) is independent of (𝒁,𝑿), the support is almost the full unit 
interval.  
The subsequent step consist in using 𝑃(𝒁)̂  to estimate a partially linear regression of 𝑌 on 
𝑿 and 𝑃(𝒁). This step allow to identify 𝛿1 and 𝛿0. 
Estimating a partially linear regression under the assumptions of separability and 
independence between 𝑿 and unobservables, presents the important advantage of relying only 
on the marginal support of 𝑃(𝒁), instead of investigating the support of 𝑃(𝒁) conditional on 
𝑿.  
The term  𝐾(𝑃(𝒁)) in equation (8’) is an unknown function that must be estimated non 
parametrically. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2006, 2011) use a local polynomial 
estimation for the estimation of 𝐾(𝑃(𝒁)) and its derivative with respect to 𝑃(𝒁), necessary 
for the identification of the MTE. Their approach suggests: from equation (8’),  
 𝐾(𝑃(𝒁)) = 𝐸(𝑌 − 𝛿0𝒙 + 𝑃(𝒁)𝑿(𝛿1 − 𝛿0)|𝑃(𝒁))  
From which, 𝐾(𝑃(𝒁))  results from the local polynomial regression of 𝑌 − 𝛿0̂𝒙 +
?̂?(𝒁)𝑿(𝛿1̂ − 𝛿0̂) on ?̂?(𝒁). Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2003) instead estimate 𝐾(𝑃(𝒁)) 
                                                          
9
 Given that 𝑿 is multidimensional they consider an index as:  𝑿[𝛿1 − 𝛿0]. 
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through local linear regression. Carneiro (2003) estimate equation (8’) using both approaches, 
a local linear regression using a biweight kernel and then polynomials in 𝑃. 
Details about semiparametric LIV estimator estimation are presented in Heckman, Urzua 
and Vytlacil (2006). 
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3 FUNDING HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE U.K. 
Investments in human capital is a major concern for governments of all countries. 
Designing reforms aimed at promoting education at all levels is an activity that could focus on 
broadening the participation to education among citizens and/or enhance the efficiency of the 
services provided, for instance by ameliorating the quality of teaching.  
In what follows, I introduce the functioning of the higher education system in the U.K., 
focusing on the aspect of the costs of access and the related reforms.  
3.1 HIGHER EDUCATION REFORMS IN THE U.K.: FROM 1960S TO OUR DAYS.  
Data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) show Higher Education (HE) 
students’ enrolments from the academic year (a.y.) 2009/10 to 2013/14; considering 
undergraduates students, enrolments remained more or less stable until a.y. 2011/12 followed 
by a large decrease of 6 percentage points in 2012/13, in correspondence to changes in tuition 
fees. (The fee’s cap has been increased to £9,000 for new entrants from 2012/13)10. The 
decline continued by another 2% between 2012/13 and 2013/14.  
At first glance, an overview of the situation over the last years catches the attention on the 
relationship between university enrolment and tuition fees/grants changes over time.  
Wyness (2010) states that in the last 50 years, students’ volume in higher education sector 
in the U.K. has more than quadrupled. Nonetheless, “in the late 1980s, the U.K. had one of 
the lowest participation rates in higher education (about 14 per cent) of any advanced 
industrial country”. (Barr and Crawford, 2005).  
The first stylized fact of this phenomenon is that while students’ volume were rising, 
funding to higher education sector were decreasing. The second stylized fact concerns social 
characteristics of students. There are much more students coming from wealthy families as 
compared to students from more disadvantaged socio-economic conditions. (Wyness, 2010).  
Increasing funding and stimulating participation, in particular among less wealthy people, 
is a goal that can be achieved through targeted reforms. 
                                                          
10
 Source: https://www.gov.uk  
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Therefore, I illustrate below the major interventions realized by the U.K.’s Government to 
address these issues.  
Today, funding system in the U.K. provides that HEIs (Higher Education Institutions) are 
publicly funded through:  
 tuition fees backed by Government-funded loans; 
 teaching grants from the Higher Education Council for England.  
For students coming from least wealthy backgrounds, the Governments also provide 
means-tested maintenance loans and maintenance grants
11
. This is the results of several 
reforms succeeded over the last 50 years. 
The major policy changes happened over 5 decades are described below. The last relevant 
HE reforms happened in 2012.  
 
3.1.1 1960s – 1990s 
Until 1963 in the U.K., policies in force envisaged a system in which all costs related to 
university, from teaching to tuition fees, from grants to administrative costs, were borne by 
taxpayers. Funding per student was high but the volume of students enrolled was small. For 
this reason, in order to encourage participation, in 1963 the Robbins Report led to an 
expansion in the number of universities. This expansion in the following twenty years pushed 
the volume of students up, even if it was still low as compared to the other industrial 
countries. Moreover, being part of the higher education system still was a privilege of richer 
families. The funding system showed some weaknesses given that maintenance grants (non-
repayable financial support) were entirely paid by the Government; for this reason, student 
loans entered the funding system. 
From 1990s to our days several reforms modified Higher Education’s access costs. In the 
following tables (Table 1- 3) relevant values (nominal) of grants, fees and loans are reported 
with respect to subsequent income brackets for academic years in which changes took place.  
  
                                                          
11
 See Government reform of higher education: twelfth report of Session 2010-12, (2012). 
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Table 1. Grants by parental income (nominal value) 
GRANTS Academic Year 
Parental income 1992/93 1998/99 2004/054 2006/075 2012/136 
≤10,000 22651 8103 1000 2.700 3.250 
20000 1362 8103 298 2.283 3.250 
30000 0 456 0 832 2.3417 
40000 0 0 0 0 523 
50000 0 0 0 0 0 
≥60000 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: computation made by Erich Battistin 
[1] Statistical First Release 1992-2002 
[2] Computed from Dearden et al (2011) 
[3] The Independent (1998), Student Choice 
[4] A Guide to Financial Support for Higher Education Students in 2005/06 
[5] Dearden et al (2011) 
[6] Statistical First Release 2012/13 
[7] 3250 −
30000−25000
5.5
, Reduced by £1 for every £5.50 of income above £25,000 up to £42,600 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Fees by parental income (nominal value) 
FEES Academic Year 
Parental 
income 
1992/93 1998/99 2004/052 2006/07 2012/13 
≤10,000 0 0 0 3,000 9,000 
20000 0 2801 0 3,000 9,000 
30000 0 1,000 8863 3,000 9,000 
40000 0 1,000 1,150 3,000 9,000 
50000 0 1,000 1,150 3,000 9,000 
≥60000 0 1,000 1150 3,000 9,000 
Source: computation made by Erich Battistin 
 [1] The Independent (1998), Student Choice 
 [2] A Guide to Financial Support for Higher Education Students in 2005/06 
 [3] 
30000−22010
9.5
+ 45 
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Table 3. Loans by parental income (nominal value) including Fee Loans introduced in 
2006/07 
LOANS Academic Year 
Parental 
income 
1992/931 1998/99 2004/054 2006/07 2012/136 
≤10,000 580 2,7352 4,095 6,555 12,875 
20000 580 2,7352 4,095 6,555 12,875 
30000 580 2,3263 4,095 7,005 13,3307 
40000 580 2,0512 3,3315 6,459 14,239 
50000 580 2,0512 3,070 6,305 13,770 
≥60000 580 2,051
2 3,070 6,305 12,5758 
Source: computation made by Erich Battistin 
[1] Statistical First Release 1992-2002 
[2] Student Loans - A Guide to Applying in 1998/99 
[3] Computed from Dearden et al (2011) 
[4] A Guide to Financial Support for Higher Education Students in 2005/06 
[5] 3075 + 1020 − (
40000−22010
9.5
+ 45 − 1175). This formula is derived from A Guide to Financial Support for 
Higher Education Students in 2005/06, but the figure for the maximum grant is from Statistical First Release 
2004/05. 
[6] Statistical First Release 2012/13 
[7] “The amount of Maintenance Grant you receive will affect the amount of Maintenance Loan you can borrow. 
We will reduce the amount of Maintenance Loan you can receive by £0.50 for every £1 of Maintenance Grant you 
are entitled to”. (3250 − 2341)0.5 + 3875 + 9000 
[8] All students are entitled to 65% of the appropriate maximum Maintenance Loan, but the remaining 35% is 
subject to means-testing. 
  
3.1.2 1990s – 2000s 
In 1990 the Student Loans Company was funded and the first Student Loan System was 
implemented. Nonetheless, the way in which loans’ accounting rules were set created some 
funding problems. In 1992 the Further and Higher Education Act
12
 was issued by the 
Government in order to convert a certain number of polytechnics and colleges of higher and 
further education into universities, and create bodies to fund higher education. In 1997 in 
order to manage the funding crisis, the Dearing Report was issued. Indeed, the expansion in 
the number of universities and students volumes was not sustained by a correspondent 
increase in the available funding per student; for this reason, the National Committee of 
Inquiry into Higher Education (chaired by Lord Dearing) was established in order to manage 
the situation. The Dearing Report introduced an important change because it involved that 
new full-time students enrolling in the a.y. 1998/99 started to contribute to the costs of higher 
education. The 1998 reform was therefore a turning point. Indeed, in 1998 the first tuition fees 
                                                          
12
 See http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1992/13/contents  
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were introduced officially for the a.y. 1998/99 through the Teaching and Higher Education 
Act; the fees amounted to £1,000. This was paid up-front just by richer families while poorest 
were exempted, given that the amount to be paid was contingent on student’s and parents’ 
income.  
Maintenance grants were abolished in 1999. For what concerns maintenance loans, these 
were increased by an amount similar to that by which grants decreased and fees increased. 
The objective of the government was to try to leave unaltered economic conditions of students 
in the period post-reform.  
3.1.3 2001 – 2015 
In 2004 the Higher Education Act was issued.  It abolished up-front fees, introduced a 
deferred fee to be implemented in 2006/07 a.y. (in England and Northern Ireland and in 
2007/08 in Wales), and re-introduced grants for a.y. 2004/05 at £ 1,000 per year for low 
income families.  
The main change produce by the Higher Education Act consisted in the introduction in the 
a.y. 2006/07 of the “deferred variable fee” (or “top-up fees”) not means-tested; each 
university could decide the amount respecting the cap of £3,000. Under this reform then, 
students face a “tuition-free entry” and start paying fees just after graduation. In order to 
promote participation, universities had to develop the Access Agreement with the Office for 
Fair Access (OFFA) in order to establish measures to support students’ participation, like 
bursary and other measures.  
Fees are with this reform deferrable until after graduation through government-subsidies 
Tuition Fee Loans, issued at zero real interest rate and repayable according to income. The 
characteristics of Tuition Fee Loans (in term of interest rate and repayment term) are the same 
of Maintenance Loan and both can be combined. 
As for the previous reform in 1998, indeed, increase in fees has been balanced by the loans 
and grants. This reform did not exempt poorest students from fees’ payment but universities 
charging fees of more than £2,700 had to offer bursaries of at least £300 to students receiving 
the maximum amount of Maintenance Loan
13
. 
                                                          
13
 See Tuition Fee Statistics (2015) 
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The  Browne Report
14
 (Securing a Sustainable Future for Higher Education: An  
independent review of higher education funding and student finance) published in October 
2010, was aimed at achieving three objectives:  
 increase the overall higher education participation, in particular, extending 
participation to poorer students that could not afford higher education; 
 improve teaching quality to enhance students’ knowledge needed in the labour 
market;  
 simplify the funding system.  
In June 2011 the Government’s Higher Education White Paper: Students at the heart of the 
system
15
 was published. It rejected some Browne Report’s proposals while accepting some 
others. The results are indicated below and entered into effects in the a.y. 2012/13. 
Following the Browne Report, the Government increased the cap on tuition fees from a 
‘basic maximum amount’ of £6,000, to an absolute maximum of £9,000 which could be 
charged only in ‘exceptional circumstances’. Students would be entitled to tuition fee loans of 
up to £9,000 per year, according to the fees charged by the institution they attend. These 
changes started to be applied from the a.y. 2012/13 for undergraduates. This is the current 
situation.  
Tuition fee Loans are still available to cover fees for both full and part-time students. Data 
from the House of Commons (see Bolton, 2015) tells that for the a.y. 2012/13 universities set 
their fees at £8,400 yet. For the current a.y. 2015/16 they increased fees up to almost £8,900.  
In the same year, about 92% of eligible full-time students from England took out Tuition Fee 
Loans. 
In order to face living expenses, full-time students have also access to maintenance loan, 
which are 65% not means-tested (students will be entitled for at least 65% of the maximum 
loan
16
) and the remaining 35% is household’s income contingent.  
Moreover, grants were established up to £3,250 and bursaries and fee waivers were also 
available.  
                                                          
14
 See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/422565/bis-10-1208-
securing-sustainable-higher-education-browne-report.pdf  
15
 See https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/higher-education-students-at-the-heart-of-the-system--2  
16
 See http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/286/286.pdf 
57 
 
 
 
Scottish HE policies have diverged under some aspects with respect to the rest of the U.K.; 
from the a.y. 2000/01 upfront tuition fees were abolished for eligible full-time students. From 
2001/02 the Graduate Endowment came into effects, that consisted in a contribution (of 
£2,000 in that year) made after graduation to be repaid in the same way as income-contingent 
loans. In 2007 the Graduate Endowment was abolished.  
 
3.2 COLLEGE PARTICIPATION: THE EFFECTS OF THE REFORMS AND OTHER INFLUENCING 
FACTORS 
Dearden, Fitzsimons, Wyness (2014) use a difference in difference approach to test the 
impact of the re-introduction of grants in the a.y. 2004/05 for students coming from poorer 
families, discovering that a £1,000 increase in grants produces an increase in participation 
among less well-off individuals of almost 4 percentage points.  
The motivation of this analysis arises from substantial differences in applications rates 
among young people with different social backgrounds observed over the years. Indeed, data 
from UCAS (2012) confirm this evidence; application rates vary a lot with respect to 
backgrounds defining a gap between young people coming from different areas. Even if 
application rates of students coming from most disadvantaged areas have sharply increased 
(about 60%) between 2004 and 2012 contributing to the reduction of the gap, a large 
differential is still present: “Those living in the lowest income areas have application rates in 
2012 of 23 per cent compared to 48 per cent for their peers living in the highest income 
areas”. (UCAS Analysis and Research, 2012).  
Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2011) estimate the effects of grants and fees on 
individuals’ likelihood of entering university considering eligible students over the period 
1992-2007. They created a pseudo-panel dataset estimated through a fixed-effects model with 
cohort defined aggregating observations on the base of geographic residence, gender, parental 
education and time. Results show that an increase of £1,000 in fees determines a decrease of 
3.9% point in the likelihood of enrolling into university. An increase in grants of the same 
amount increase participation of 2.6 percentage point. 
Two important aspects are underlined in this analysis: the impact of parents’ education and 
prior individual’s educational attainments are strong and significant. In particular, individual 
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having more educated parents and with good secondary education results are more likely to 
enrol into university.  
Social background, family’s financial situation, cognitive and non-cognitive skills are all 
important aspects to be considered when performing empirical analysis in the educational 
sector and, above all, should be factors to be investigated in order to develop effective policy 
reforms.  
What emerges from data and research results discussed above is that financial aid to more 
disadvantaged individuals has a positive causal effect in terms of higher education 
participation but there also other factors driving educational choices that need to be addressed. 
Therefore, we can ask ourselves: are tuition alone sufficient to reduce the existing gap and 
lead to a future convergence between different socio-economics groups of individuals? Or are 
there other ways to efficiently invest Government resources? 
When considering that in order to be accepted into university a student has to obtain some 
further educational qualification
17
 (e.g. A levels or other qualifications depending on the 
university chosen)  it could be argued that reforming university’s access costs  would not be 
sufficient for these individuals when they have not even achieved the minimum requirements 
to enter it.  
Individuals may find themselves in this situation as a consequence of the socio-economic 
background of their family. Obviously, other factors determine education achievement, in 
particular cognitive and non-cognitive skills but this does not preclude that there exists a 
category of children with the suitable ability, whose performances and ambitions are restraint 
by the environment and family.  
Crawford and Greaves (2015) have highlighted these aspects as the results of their 
research. They investigate the effect of socio-economic background on university. Raw 
differences between highest and lowest socio-economic quintile groups are large (the first 
have 3 times more probability of enrolling than the other); the interesting aspect is that 
differences are reduced a lot when controlling for prior education attainment. In particular, 
results obtained by children at 16 years old (General Certificate of Secondary Education, 
                                                          
17
 Education system in the U.K. involve children to be in secondary education (compulsory) until 16 years old. 
Next stages are Further Education (FE) from 16 to 18 years old and Higher Education (HE) which involve 
undergraduate and postgraduate courses.  
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GCSE) are alone sufficient to explain a substantial part of raw differences. Secondary school 
seems to play a crucial role even because it influences post-secondary school achievement 
(Further Education). The latter, most of the times necessary to entry into university. The 
evidence suggests that children from more disadvantaged families get worse secondary school 
results. 
Chowdry et al., (2012) confirm this evidence: “(…) poor attainment in secondary schools 
is more important in explaining lower HE participation rates amongst students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds than barriers arising at the point of entry into HE”. This leads to 
investigate the true nature of constraints that prevents enrolment in higher education. Maybe 
there are several factors that induce individuals to stay out of higher education other than 
economics issues, that in any case are an important obstacles faced by more disadvantaged 
families. Policy reforms that address this concerns are necessary in inducing individuals into 
participation,  nevertheless as Chowdry et al. (2012) argue, most disadvantaged students my 
anticipate access barriers to the time they are in secondary education precluding themselves 
the possibility of obtaining a degree, besides to whichever tuition reforms could be put in 
place.  
Data from Corver (2010), reports trends in the enrolment rate into higher education 
institutions in England.  
As shown in Figure 1 the volume of young people enrolling into higher education sector 
has continued to increase starting from mid-1990s. In particular, we can see that after the 
reform for the a.y. 1998/99 that introduced for the first time tuition fees the pattern has not 
been negatively influenced. The report specifies that starting from the mid-2000s the 
differences in participation between young people from different backgrounds started to 
contract;  the 2003/04 reform actually produced more favourable access condition for poorer 
students while establishing more burdensome rules for richest families
18
.  Indeed, even if the 
proportion of students from more advantaged backgrounds has increased by 5 per cent over 
last five years, proportion of students from more disadvantaged ones has increased by 30 per 
cent over the same period in England.  
                                                          
18
 Disadvantaged backgrounds are defined on the base of disadvantaged neighbourhoods, parental education, 
occupation or income.  
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Figure 1. Trends in young participation in England
 
 Source: Trends in young participation in higher education: core results for England (2010) 
The report, even if it does not provide evidence on the existence of any causal effect, 
underlines the influence that prior educational attainment has on the trend described above: 
“The increases in the proportion of young people living in the most disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods who enter higher education are consistent with other statistics including 
recent trends in GCSE attainment”. (See Corver, 2010, 2).  
All these aspects considered together, suggests that there is still a lot to investigate in order 
to understand the mechanism that shapes individual decision-making process. The focus 
should be understand what are the main drivers of higher education, how to intervene on these 
ones to stimulate university participation and identify the target population that should be the 
focus of future reforms.  
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4 ESTIMATING RETURNS TO HIGHER EDUCATION 
IN THE U.K. 
In this chapter I will present the analysis conducted on U.K. data to estimate the effect of 
holding an higher education qualification on future earnings.  
The aim is that of evaluate the monetary returns that individuals induced to enrol into 
higher education by a set of policy reforms have experienced, and possibly perform an ex-ante 
evaluation that allows to considering potential efficient changes in future policies.  
4.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
The analysis conducted in this dissertation is based on data from the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS). It consists in a panel dataset that follows a sample of individuals over 
time, from 1991 to 2009. It is made of 18 waves, each one reporting data at an individuals and 
household level. With annual frequency, each adult member (aged at least 16 years old) of a 
household of a nationally representative sample of more than 5,000 households is 
interviewed, resulting in approximately 10,000 individual interviews. When an individual left 
the initial household, it was followed to the new one interviewing the new components.  
For the purpose of this dissertation this dataset is useful to detect all information at the 
individual level over time and also link them to information at the household level related to 
each individual selected. 
The aim is evaluating the returns to higher education (focusing on undergraduate degrees) 
for a sample of individuals that face certain levels of university’s access costs and benefits at 
the time they are eligible. 
I have developed a cohort analysis considering eleven cohorts of individuals selected with 
the following procedures: 
 For each year between 1992 and 2002 individuals “eligible” for university’s 
enrolment has been considered. Eligibility is a condition based on the date of birth: 
“(…)in the UK, eligibility for the first year of HE is determined by date of birth. 
(…) youths become eligible for HE if they are aged 18 before August 31st of that 
academic year. This means that young people can be aged either 18 or 19 when 
they first become eligible for HE”. (See Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness, 70, 
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2014). Therefore, cohorts are created considering the date of birth such that for 
each cohort individuals are already aged either 18 or 19.  
 The second step consists in looking for each individual at their wages 6 years after 
the enrolment (therefore 3 years after graduation).  
 Finally, all other relevant explanatory variables are selected. 
In what follows I list and described dependent and independent variables considered in the 
equations to be estimated. 
4.2 DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
Consider the Mincer Equation  as presented in Chapter 2: 
 𝑌𝑖 =  α + β𝑆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
The dependent variable and the endogenous regressor are: 
 Logpaygu:  logarithm of wpaygu “usual gross pay per month of the current job”. 
This variable has been preferred to other earning’s indicator because of the limited 
number of missing values. 
 Schooling: the treatment status dummy has been constructed considering the 
variable wqfedhi (highest educational qualification) in the BHPS. This variable has 
been observed for all individuals selected, in the year in which their wages are 
measured. This is the only indicator that permits to determine if an individual has 
achieved some qualifications from 18 years old onward. Other variables denoting 
educational achievements are also present, but they are uninformative because of 
the high rates of missing values.  
Therefore, all individuals claiming to have a “First Degree”, “Teaching 
Qualification”, “Nursing Qualification” or “other Higher Qualifications19” (Higher 
Degree
20
 excluded) are selected in the treatment group. 808 individuals are 
observed in total, 486 for S=1, 322 for S=0. 
 
                                                          
19
 Foundation Degree, Diploma of Higher Education, Certificate of Higher Education, Higher National Diploma. 
(See http://www.educationuk.org/global/articles/higher-education-courses-qualifications/ ) 
20
 Postgraduate qualifications 
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Hereafter, I estimate returns to Higher Education adopting methodologies explained in 
Chapter 2., in order to deal with selection in levels and selection on returns. Consequently, I 
define a set of instrumental and control variables, as detailed below.  
Instrumental Variables: 
 𝒁  is the vector of instrumental variables: 
o Fees, Grants, Loans: these are the access costs and benefits for a.y. between 
1992/93 – 2002/03 established by the reforms presented in Chapter 3. They are 
attached to each individual on the base of the household income selected in the year 
the students is eligible. The variable considered to determine family income is 
wfihhyr (annual household income from September previous here to September 
current year). 
o Distance: the variable indicates the distance to the nearest university in miles. 
This variable was not available in the BHPS and it has been constructed. BHPS 
data of the Local Authority Districts (LAD
21
) codes have been selected for each 
household in which the individual was living at eligible age. For the limited number 
of waves it was not possible to identify the LAD of residence at 16 years old. From 
the higher education statistics agency website
22
, I have retrieve data about Higher 
Education Providers. Using geographic coordinates of LAD and Universities I have 
calculated distance in miles to the nearest institute. Distance to the nearest 
university is typically considered as an instrument because it should affect the costs 
faced by the individual that attend university.  
Control variables: 
 𝑿  is the set of controls that forms the conditioning set: 
o Sex 
o Age 
                                                          
21
 LAD definition refers to the “Census 1991: Individual Sample for Anonymised Records for Great Britain 
(SARs)”. 
22
 https://www.hesa.ac.uk/component/heicontacts/  
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o Qual: this dummy indicate if the individual declares to possess GCSEs with 
grade A-C
23
 (or equivalent qualification for Scotland: Standard Grades). A more 
suitable indicator of educational attainment would be the number of subjects passed 
with highest grade (e.g. at least 5 GCSEs grade A-C), unfortunately even if present, 
these variables report a high number of missing values. As discussed in Chapter 3., 
qualifications obtained at the end of secondary school influence the probability of 
attending university.  
o Jbstat: is a categorical variable (recoded with respect to the original present in 
the BHPS) that indicates if in the eligibility year the individual is either working 
(1), studying (2) or find itself in other status (e.g. is unemployed, in family care, 
disabled) (3). 
The decision of controlling for this variable derives from the fact that an individual 
who is already employed at 18 years old may be less motivated to enrol, if he finds 
itself in a good working environment or, alternatively, it could also be that having a 
job stimulates the propensity to enrol since the individual would feel itself more 
able to face its own spending needs, weighing less on parents. 
o Mqfedhi: highest educational mother qualification reported in the year the 
individual is eligible. Since this variable was not present in the dataset it has been 
constructed keeping the identification number of the mother of each individual and 
looking at its level of educational qualification reported in the “eligibility” year of 
the children. For limited number of waves available, it was not possible to retrieve 
the educational qualification of the mother when the individual was in secondary 
school. It takes value 1 for “further/higher qualifications”, 2 for “secondary 
education or apprenticeship”, 3 for “no qualifications”. The importance of 
introducing this variable among the controls is deducted from the impact that 
familiar characteristics have on the decision of children to enrol, as explained in 
Chapter 3. 
o Fisit: it is a subjective indication of the financial situation expressed by the 
father of the household. It has been re-managed from the original variable in the 
dataset, keeping the identification number of the father and looking at the variable 
                                                          
23
 The General Certificate of Standard Education is a qualification obtained at the end of compulsory education 
(15-16 years old) throughout all the country with standardized grades between A and G. Good qualifications, 
also required by colleges and universities, are those graded A-C. 
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fisit in the year of “eligibility” of the children. It is a dummy that takes value one 
for “wealthy/relaxed” situations and zero for “borderline/bad” situations. The 
reason for introducing it in the dataset is the same concerning the importance of 
controlling for familiar backgrounds. 
o Unat18: is the unemployment rate for young aged 15-19 years old in the U.K. 
for all educational levels, measured in the year individual are eligible. The source is 
the Eurostat LFS
24
. This variable is used in the conditioning set of the first stage 
regression as a measure to control for the characteristics of the labour market at the 
time the individual has to choose if enrol into Higher Education or look for a job. 
o Unwork: is the unemployment rate for young up to 25 years in the U.K. 
measured in the year in which wages are observed. The source is the Eurostat LFS. 
This variable is used in the conditioning set of the outcome equation as a measure 
to control for labour market characteristics at the time the individual is already 
graduated. 
o Incomeclass: this is a categorical variable that indicates income brackets over 
which fees, grants and loans are calculated. It takes value 1 for “low income” 
(<£20.000), 2 for “medium income” (£20.000-£40.000), 3 for “high income” 
(>£40.000). It is used in the conditioning set of the first stage regression. 
o Cohort dummies and regional dummies. Regions considered are those indicated 
by the variable Region2 (Government Office Region)
25
.  
 
Table 4. shows the descriptive statistics of the variables presented above. It is clear that 
certain variables determine a great reduction in the number of observations. This refers in 
particular to mqfedhi and fisit, and as explained later this can be a source of bias in the 
estimation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database  
25
 North East, North West, Yorkshire & Humber, East Midlands, West Midlands, East of England, London, South 
East, South West, Wales, Scotland. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
logpaygu 808 7.071698 0.5100139 4.685213 8.613273 
schooling 808 0.6014851 0.4898957 0 1 
fees 808 312.4072 459.3291 0 1075 
grants 808 692.7327 938.2617 0 2265 
loans 808 1971.601 1103.971 580 3905 
distance 784 7.740855 7.73734 0.03 38.31 
sex 808 0.480198 0.4999172 0 1 
age 808 18.13738 0.3444573 18 19 
qual 796 0.0942211 0.2923198 0 1 
jbstat 807 1.656753 0.666386 1 3 
mqfedhi 471 1.876858 0.7947404 1 3 
fisit 444 0.6509009 0.4772231 0 1 
unat18 808 16.40718 1.739745 13.5 19.2 
unwork 808 12.9724 1.054673 11.7 15 
incomeclass 808 1.851485 0.7301086 1 3 
 
 
4.3 MODEL’S EQUATIONS  
Marginal returns to a Higher Education are estimated here applying a parametric normal 
model using the Heckman two-step procedure. 
Recalling the theoretical framework defined in section 2.3 and Equations (2)-(7) describing 
the Generalized Roy Model, in Chapter 2., the estimation involves the following steps
26
: 
1. Estimation of the Propensity Score from the first stage regression: 
𝑃(𝒛) = Pr(𝑆 = 1| 𝒁 = 𝒛, 𝑿 = 𝒙) 
From this regression it possible to obtain the predicted values of 𝜇𝑠 , 𝜇?̂? , the 
coefficients from the regression of the schooling indicator on the instruments 
conditional on the set of controls. The predicted value of the propensity score is 
therefore 𝑃(𝒛)̂ =  Φ(𝜇?̂?𝒁). Calculate then the normal density function using  𝜇?̂?, equal 
to ϕ(𝜇?̂?𝒁), that allows to generate the selection term (Inverse Mill’s ratio). 
                                                          
26
 See Heckman, Urzua and Vytlacil (2006) and Heckman, Tobias and Vytlacil (2001).  
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2. At this point is necessary to define the common support (between 0 and 1) of 
the propensity score. Select intervals of 0.01 points to determine the grid over which 
to compare the frequencies of the propensity scores for both groups of treated and 
untreated.  For each range, keep observations only if positive frequencies in both 
group (S=0,1) exist. The marginal treatment effect as evaluated here below makes 
sense only within this common support. 
3. Run the outcome regressions for each group separately, thus: 
𝐸(𝑌|𝑿 = 𝑥, 𝑆 = 1, 𝑃(𝒁) = 𝑝) =  𝛼1 + ?̂? + 𝑿𝛽1 + 𝜌1 (−
ϕ(𝜇?̂?𝒁)
Φ(𝜇?̂?𝒁)
) for S=1 
𝐸(𝑌|𝑿 = 𝑥, 𝑆 = 0, 𝑃(𝒁) = 𝑝) =  𝛼0 + 𝑿𝛽0 + 𝜌0 (
ϕ(𝜇?̂?𝒁)
1−Φ(𝜇?̂?𝒁)
) for S=0; 
4. From step 3 we obtain 𝛼1 + ?̂?, 𝛼0̂, 𝛽1̂, 𝛽0̂, 𝜌1̂, 𝜌0̂  that permit to calculate the 
MTE. So, keeping the mean values of all variables in the 𝑿  vector, the MTE is: 
𝑀𝑇𝐸(̂  𝑿 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝑠 = 𝑢𝑠) = (𝛼1 + ?̂? − 𝛼0̂) + ?̅?(𝛽1̂ − 𝛽0̂) + (𝜌1̂ − 𝜌0̂)Φ
−1(𝑢𝑠) 
Where 𝑈𝑠= 1- Φ(𝜇?̂?𝒁), is the probability not to be treated. The MTE is evaluated at 
the margin of indifference, therefore at the values of the unobservables that make the 
individual indifference between enrolment or not. Φ−1(𝑢𝑠)= - 𝜇?̂?𝒁.  
The coefficient (𝜌1̂ − 𝜌0̂) if statistically significant indicates that there is selection 
on unobservables. If 𝜌1̂ < 𝜌0̂, there is selection on returns.  
4.4 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Hereafter I present estimation results obtained applying the above stated model.  
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4.4.1 First-stage regression 
Table 5.  Probit regression (1) 
Probit regression         Number of 
obs= 409 
      LR chi2(33)= 74.27 
      Prob > chi2= 0.0001 
Log likelihood = -237.88064         Pseudo R2= 0.135 
schooling Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
         
fees -0.0010449 0.0010166 -1.03 0.304 -0.0030374 0.0009476 
grants 0.0003464 0.0003433 1.01 0.313 -0.0003264 0.0010193 
loans -0.0009504 0.0005929 -1.60 0.109 -0.0021124 0.0002117 
distance -0.0099131 0.009275 -1.07 0.285 -0.0280917 0.0082656 
sex -0.0057636 0.1424166 -0.04 0.968 -0.284895 0.2733677 
age 0.0520573 0.2215278 0.23 0.814 -0.3821291 0.4862437 
qual 0.1067409 0.2916708 0.37 0.714 -0.4649234 0.6784052 
jbstat 0.2846678 0.1030772 2.76 0.006 0.0826402 0.4866955 
unat18 -2.59579 1.319089 -1.97 0.049 -5.181157 -0.0104232 
_Imqfedhi_2 -0.1402572 0.1626493 -0.86 0.389 -0.4590441 0.1785296 
_Imqfedhi_3 -0.2764767 0.1868908 -1.48 0.139 -0.642776 0.0898225 
fisit 0.0469359 0.1545225 0.30 0.761 -0.2559226 0.3497944 
_Iincomecla_2 0.6597746 0.6583042 1.00 0.316 -0.6304779 1.950027 
_Iincomecla_3 0.6359548 0.7071711 0.90 0.368 -0.7500751 2.021985 
_Icohort_2 8.315 3.894383 2.14 0.033 0.6821491 1.594785 
_Icohort_3 7.639767 3.507563 2.18 0.029 0.7650699 1.451446 
_Icohort_4 4.042627 1.626069 2.49 0.013 0.8555899 7.229664 
_Icohort_5 4.969295 2.19518 2.26 0.024 0.6668217 9.271768 
_Icohort_6 1.97956 0.4996489 3.96 0.000 1.000267 2.958854 
_Icohort_7 0.9706057 0.7305394 1.33 0.184 -0.4612253 2.402437 
_Icohort_8 1.652889 1.179638 1.40 0.161 -0.6591595 3.964938 
_Icohort_9 2.54744 1.558009 1.64 0.102 -0.506202 5.601082 
_Icohort_10 -3.058033 1.469071 -2.08 0.037 -5.937359 -0.1787072 
_Iregion2_2 0.1835043 0.3688069 0.50 0.619 -0.539344 0.9063526 
_Iregion2_3 -0.1275673 0.3949873 -0.32 0.747 -0.9017282 0.6465936 
_Iregion2_4 -0.3590907 0.3842141 -0.93 0.350 -1.112137 0.3939551 
_Iregion2_5 -0.0727445 0.3958803 -0.18 0.854 -0.8486556 0.7031666 
_Iregion2_6 -0.053179 0.3783943 -0.14 0.888 -0.7948183 0.6884603 
_Iregion2_7 0.265451 0.3763639 0.71 0.481 -0.4722087 1.003111 
_Iregion2_8 -0.1911401 0.3516647 -0.54 0.587 -0.8803903 0.4981102 
_Iregion2_9 -0.0926924 0.3920143 -0.24 0.813 -0.8610264 0.6756415 
_Iregion2_10 0.1724351 0.3835363 0.45 0.653 -0.5792822 0.9241524 
_Iregion2_11 0.9221118 0.4160514 2.22 0.027 0.106666 1.737558 
_cons 4.051678 2.181731 1.86 0.063 -2.244366 8.327792 
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From Table 5. the first aspect to be noticed is the statistical insignificance of the instrument 
chosen. This is a fundamental problem because under this condition the exclusion restriction 
is not satisfied. Therefore, the model is not identified since is not possible to extrapolate any 
exogenous variation in the probability of being enrolled into university. Consequently, the 
endogeneity problem cannot be solved and this preclude the estimation of the Marginal 
Treatment Effect or other parameter of interest.  
Anyway, the attempt is try to analyse the evidence obtained to investigate, for what 
possible,  the source of the problem. 
Therefore, I try to specify alternative regression equations modifying the conditioning set, 
in order to see if the R-squared improve. In doing this I proceed without going against the 
theoretical setting that justifies the application of the model as presented in last chapters. 
Consequently, as seen in Chapter 3., familiar characteristics are typically controlled for in the 
estimation of the probability of enrolling into university, since they are a factor driving 
heterogeneity in enrolment among students.  
Dropping sex and age (controls with the high level of the p-value) and qual (highest grades 
of secondary educational qualification achieved) does not lead to any improvement in terms 
of pseudo R-squared. The reason for dropping qual arises from the concern that it could be a 
“bad control”, meaning that it could be itself an outcome of another variable, e.g. mqfedhi 
(mother education) in this case. The doubt arises from empirical evidence presented in 
Chapter 3. The literature suggests that qualifications obtained at 16 years old have a great 
impact on university enrolment but at the same time, children with highest qualification are 
those belonging to higher social class’ families, with more propensity for education. It is also 
to be considered that this variable gives just a rough measure of prior educational attainment 
as explained in previous section. A more precise indicator would control for the number of 
subjects passed with the highest grades in order to have a proxy for the measure of ability at 
16 years old. 
The major improvement in term of pseudo R-squared is achieved when the instrument 
distsance to nearest university in dropped. The concern about the validity of this instrument is 
that from BHPS data it was not possible to retrieve the urban residence of each individuals at 
the age of 14 or 16 (as for example considered in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2011). 
Distance has been measured considering local authority district of residence in the 
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“eligibility” year. This could mean that distance appears to be not exogenous if for example 
the family has decide to move after secondary school to permit continuation into further 
education of the children.  
The alternative specification of the first-stage regression dropping distance has not lead to 
any substantial improvement in the statistical significance (or value of) of other coefficients. 
Number of observations also remain substantially the same (N=426).  
Last consideration focuses on sample size. Keeping some variable in the conditioning set, 
like mqfedhi and fisit, shrinks the sample a lot (see Table 6.- 7.) 
Table 6. 
 financial situation report by father  
schooling 0 (bord/bad) 1 (wealthy/rel) Total 
0 68 105 173 
1 87 184 271 
Total 155 289 444 
    
Table 7. 
  highest educational qualification      
schooling 1(further/high) 2(sec or app.) 3(no qual) Total 
0 55 73 64 192 
1 126 94 59 279 
Total 181 167 123 471 
Indeed, the Probit first-stage regression considerably change excluding these controls (see 
Table 8.) (the sample size almost double), maybe indicating the poor performance of the 
Maximum Likelihood estimator on small samples.  
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Table 8. Probit regression (2) 
Probit regression                                     Number of obs= 806 
                                                     LR chi2(27)=  64.75 
                                                     Prob > chi2=      0.0001 
Log likelihood = -509.50087                               Pseudo R2= 0.0597 
schooling Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf.Interval] 
         
fees -0.0010294 0.0005196 -1.98 0.048 -0.0020478 -0.000011 
grants 0.0003303 0.0001946 1.70 0.090 -0.0000511 0.0007117 
loans -0.0006339 0.0003663 -1.73 0.084 -0.0013519 0.0000841 
jbstat 0.2682615 0.0694446 3.86 0.000 0.1321525 0.4043705 
unat18 -1.785101 0.7651616 -2.33 0.020 -3.28479 -0.2854122 
_Iincomecla_2 0.4007677 0.3603031 1.11 0.266 -0.3054134 1.106949 
_Iincomecla_3 0.5930517 0.4253723 1.39 0.163 -0.2406626 1.426766 
_Icohort_2 5.576763 2.271392 2.46 0.014 1.124917 1.002861 
_Icohort_3 5.052427 2.056147 2.46 0.014 1.022454 9.0824 
_Icohort_4 2.498071 1.016143 2.46 0.014 0.506468 4.489675 
_Icohort_5 3.45908 1.379122 2.51 0.012 0.756051 6.162109 
_Icohort_6 1.021856 0.3470302 2.94 0.003 0.3416895 1.702023 
_Icohort_7 0.8693246 0.381167 2.28 0.023 0.1222511 1.616398 
_Icohort_8 1.354933 0.6796123 1.99 0.046 0.0229172 2.686949 
_Icohort_9 1.981313 0.8985634 2.20 0.027 0.2201611 3.742465 
_Icohort_10 -2.114388 0.8657716 -2.44 0.015 -3.811.269 -0.4175071 
_Iregion2_2 0.380157 0.2705667 1.41 0.160 -0.1501439 0.9104579 
_Iregion2_3 0.2486645 0.2884461 0.86 0.389 -0.3166795 0.8140085 
_Iregion2_4 0.0108054 0.2841473 0.04 0.970 -0.5461131 0.567724 
_Iregion2_5 0.2687559 0.2952604 0.91 0.363 -0.3099439 0.8474557 
_Iregion2_6 0.1007669 0.2906205 0.35 0.729 -0.4688389 0.6703726 
_Iregion2_7 0.4182252 0.2883784 1.45 0.147 -0.146986 0.9834364 
_Iregion2_8 0.2528414 0.263979 0.96 0.338 -0.2645479 0.7702307 
_Iregion2_9 0.0189919 0.2779702 0.07 0.946 -0.5258197 0.5638034 
_Iregion2_10 0.3553505 0.2868336 1.24 0.215 -0.206833 0.9175339 
_Iregion2_11 0.5693553 0.28003 2.03 0.042 0.0205066 1.118204 
_Iregion2_12 -0.3669044 0.3947927 -0.93 0.353 -1.140684 0.4068751 
_cons 2.818853 1.25253 2.25 0.024 3.639397 5.273766 
 
Estimation appears to be very sensitive to the increase of sample size (N=806) that has 
almost doubled. It results in a remarkable decrease in the p-values of the instruments at the 
5% level, with fees becoming weakly significant. Dropping the dummy for incomeclass 
generate an even greater impact on estimates’ precision. (see Table 9.)  
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Table 9. Probit regression (3) 
Probit regression       Number of obs= 806 
      LR chi2(25)= 62.73 
      Prob > chi2= 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -510.50889             Pseudo R2= 0.0579 
Schooling Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf. Interval] 
         
Fees -0.0006281 0.0002431 -2.58 0.010 -0.0011046 -0.0001516 
Grants 0.0001259 0.0000712 1.77 0.077 -0.0000136 0.0002654 
Loans -0.0007222 0.0002429 -2.97 0.003 -0.0011983 -0.0002461 
Jbstat 0.2725542 0.069329 3.93 0.000 0.1366718 0.4084366 
unat18 -1.722009 0.4761413 -3.62 0.000 -2.655229 -0.7887896 
_Icohort_2 5.426281 1.439074 3.77 0.000 2.605747 8.246815 
_Icohort_3 4.955715 1.307045 3.79 0.000 2.393954 7.517477 
_Icohort_4 2.61174 0.6860248 3.81 0.000 1.267156 3.956323 
_Icohort_5 3.588679 0.9158136 3.92 0.000 1.793717 5.383641 
_Icohort_6 1.25975 0.2749014 4.58 0.000 0.7209529 1.798547 
_Icohort_7 0.7701347 0.277317 2.78 0.005 0.2266034 1.313666 
_Icohort_8 1.215305 0.4299538 2.83 0.005 0.3726116 2.057999 
_Icohort_9 1.861179 0.5578092 3.34 0.001 0.7678927 2.954465 
_Icohort_10 -2.072444 0.5785431 -3.58 0.000 -3.206368 -0.9385202 
_Iregion2_2 0.3764103 0.2704252 1.39 0.164 -0.1536133 0.9064339 
_Iregion2_3 0.2286591 0.2879848 0.79 0.427 -0.3357808 0.7930989 
_Iregion2_4 0.0019163 0.2835529 0.01 0.995 -0.5538373 0.5576698 
_Iregion2_5 0.2640437 0.2950912 0.89 0.371 -0.3143243 0.8424118 
_Iregion2_6 0.0899581 0.2900213 0.31 0.756 -0.4784732 0.6583895 
_Iregion2_7 0.4034632 0.2882444 1.40 0.162 -0.1614853 0.9684118 
_Iregion2_8 0.2558676 0.2636728 0.97 0.332 -0.2609217 0.7726569 
_Iregion2_9 0.0147634 0.2772579 0.05 0.958 -0.528652 0.5581789 
_Iregion2_10 0.349902 0.2865304 1.22 0.222 -0.2116872 0.9114912 
_Iregion2_11 0.5567052 0.2796686 1.99 0.047 0.0085648 1.104846 
_Iregion2_12 -0.3908767 0.3943201 -0.99 0.322 -1.16373 0.3819765 
_cons 2.764955 7.894069 3.50 0.000 1.217746 4.312164 
 
Distance is not included in Table 9.; anyway running the Probit estimates with Distance 
confirms the evidence before presented. The effect of Distance is not statistically significant 
at 5% level (P-value 0.319) and its inclusion does not alter other coefficients’ estimates. 
In conclusion, estimates are very sensitive under different specification and sample size 
preventing a logical interpretation of results and above all, a valid continuation of the 
analysis. Indeed, what emerges from Table 5. is that not only there is no exclusion restriction 
73 
 
 
 
available, but also there is not a sufficient evidence in the data that allows to conclude that 
mother education, qualification obtained at 16 years old and the subjective consideration of 
the household’s financial situation have an impact in university enrolment. 
The only variables that throughout all specifications have an impact (respectively positive 
and negative on the enrolment probability) are the employment status of the individual in the 
eligible year  (jbstat) and the unemployment rate in the same year for individuals aged 15-19 
(unat18).  This probably indicates that students having the possibility of working before 
university have more probability of enrolling because they are able to gain some money that 
will help in facing the financial sacrifice (or acquiring more independence from parents). This 
interpretation would be in line with the negative impact of the unemployment rate. 
In Table 9. even if the instruments acquire some significance (at least for fees and loans), 
this is not sufficient to prove their validity and that they provide the necessary variation over 
time to define a common support of the propensity score which is large enough to estimate the 
MTE at all point of the margin of indifference.  
Assuming the instrument are valid, therefore fees, grants and loans are uncorrelated with 
unobservable components of the outcome equation, it may be that their relevance is small. By 
just looking at the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressor 
(schooling) it may raise the doubt of dealing with weak instruments. (Table 10.) 
Table 10. Correlation coefficients 
  schooling fees grants loans 
schooling 1.0000     
fees -0.0005 1.0000    
grants 0.0131 -0.4595 1.0000   
loans 0.0248 0.5502 -0.4648 1.0000 
 
First-stage regression leads to determine the common support of the propensity scores over 
which the margins of indifference are identified.  
With the data available no margin can be identified in order to calculate the parameter of 
interest, but it is possible to see the graph of the common support to understand the 
implications of dealing with non-performing instruments. As described in Chapter 2., having 
multiple continuous instruments is a fundamental requirement in order to enlarge the common 
support of the propensity score. This allows to recover all parameters of interest, but in 
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particular to determine the treatment effect for all individuals selected who find themselves at 
different margins of indifference, identified by all values of the unobserved components that 
make them less likely to participate.  
The larger the support, the more margins are identified and also the more precise the 
estimates are; indeed, sample size is also affected by the common support that we are able to 
define. For all ranges of the p-score in which we detect observations belonging to just one 
treatment status group, those observations have to be deleted. This can exert a negative impact 
especially when dealing with small sample as in the case of the current analysis.  
Below is shown the Graph 1. of the common support of the propensity score resulting from 
the first-stage regression of Table 9. The common support in this case is in the range [0.35 – 
0.8] and just in some isolated point outside it. Therefore, we are quite far from achieving a 
full support situation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The selection of the right instrument is a great concern when Instrumental Variable, both 
local and linear in general, are applied. For instance, Carneiro and Heckman (2002) analyse 
the nature of credit constraints effect on the decision to enrol into post-secondary education 
distinguishing the effect of short-run liquidity constraint from long-term ones. In their 
analysis, they criticize the choice of common instruments in the literature of returns to 
Graph 1. Common support of the propensity score 
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schooling, like tuition and distance to college arguing that these are invalid instruments. In 
particular, they develop a two-period model of credit-constraint schooling taking into 
consideration college quality in individuals’ decision. They argue that the invalidity of 
instruments commonly chosen derives from the fact that these are correlated with school 
quality, which enters into the potential wage equation.  
Obviously their analysis reflect the American situation, but it is not to exclude that this can 
a point of debate also in the case of the U.K.; in particular, after the reform of 2006/07 
university are made free to establish the amount of fees they want respecting the maximum 
one fixed by the reform. Under this scheme, it would be reasonable to assume that highest 
quality college feel free to charge higher amounts justifying higher quality of teaching and if 
this is the case, tuition are related to university’s quality. Even if the analysis here conducted 
involve access costs up to 2002/03, in the BHPS there are not any variable that indicate or 
proxy the quality of the institute attended, therefore it would not suitable to perform analysis 
for subsequent cohort under the framework developed here.  
4.5 POSSIBLE EXTENSION AND THE EX-ANTE EVALUATION OF RETURNS TO 
EDUCATION 
As described in Chapter 2., the estimation of the Marginal Treatment Effect using a 
structural model like the Generalized Roy model, that allows to account for the decision 
process of the individual when they self-select into schooling, is a methodology that under the 
stated assumptions allow to perform a wide range of evaluations.  
With the appropriate data indeed, it is possible not only to estimate the causal effect of a 
certain “treatment”, which in this case is the possess of a Higher Educational qualification, 
but also try to identify the effect for a particular set of individual that stays on “the margin”. 
Having the possibility to recognize this class of individuals permit develop some 
considerations about the mechanism to enlarge participation into higher education. This can 
be achieved through some policy reforms, that can induce individuals to enrol.  
This is the point in which ex-post evaluation can be linked with an ex-ante approach. 
Unfortunately, the data used in the analysis presented in this dissertation have demonstrated to 
be not suitable for this kind of study. As a consequence, with a small sample and weak 
instruments it is not possible to perform an ex-ante evaluation of potential new policy rules 
concerning access costs to higher education. 
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If this would have been possible, some other parameters would have been considered, like 
the Policy Relevant Treatment Effect. By simulating a marginal change in policy affecting 
tuition, therefore in the instruments, it would have been possible to see: how the propensity of 
enrolling into higher education change, and what would have been the potential outcome 
change associated with new value of the propensity score.  
The shortcoming of this approach is that all relies on the availability of good instruments, 
which are typically difficult to be found.  
In the literature indeed, the largest part of studies that focus on the evaluation of policy 
reforms in the higher education sector in the U.K. are concentrated on the estimation of the 
causal effect of a particular set of access rule on the probability to enrol, without extending 
the analysis on the estimation of the returns to this “treatment”.   
Analysing the effect on future wages of holding an higher educational qualification for 
those individual that has been induced into participation by the set of reforms in act at the 
time they were eligible, requires a great quantity (and quality) of data.  
An alternative way of deriving an ex-ante evaluation framework, is that of taking 
inspiration from the existing studies that evaluate the effect of tuition’s reform on university 
enrolment to develop and validate a structural model that allows to perform an ex-ante 
analysis. 
As seen in the first chapter, in the literature many empirical studies that are aimed to 
perform ex-ante evaluation start from a natural or quasi-natural experiment as the basis to 
validate a structural model.  
For example, Attanasio, Meghir and Santiago (2012) develop a dynamic school 
participation model to study the effect of a monetary subsidy on school participation. 
Obviously, in that case they rely on a solid base in order to validate their formulation, the 
randomized social experiment Progresa. Anyway, we have seen that all kind of ex-post 
evaluation studies can be used as the ground against which benchmark a structural model, 
especially if a certain policy have been evaluated by different authors and with different 
methodologies.  
This for example could be applied also for what concerns the estimation of the latest 
reforms happened in the U.K.; Dearden, Fitzsimons, Wyness (2014) have studied the effect of 
the re-introduction of grants for low-income students, taking high-income students as the 
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control group. The causal effect results to be positive and even if it refers only to the a 
particular measure in a particular time it would be a good basis to design a dynamic/discrete 
choice model that would be used to test ex-ante the effect of different potential values of 
grants.  
Even if limited only to a particular measure, it would be a starting point to conduct ex-ante 
analysis when other kind of techniques are difficult to be applied. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has investigated the methods that allows to perform ex-post evaluation and to 
exploit the results obtained to conduct ex-ante evaluation.  
The fundamental difference between ex-post and ex-ante approaches is that the latter is 
realized by modelling the behaviour and decision making process of agents. This is typically 
achieved through structural models, estimated parametrically or non-parametrically. 
Structural models describing behaviour of agents take the form of discrete choice models 
based on a latent variable specification. These models, in particular under parametric 
specifications, rely on some assumptions concerning functional forms and the distribution of 
unobservables that, even if strong, allow the parametric specification to be a powerful tool to 
predict the effects of policies never implemented.  
A part from the way in which structural models are estimated, they need to satisfy an 
exclusion restriction that ensure identification. The design of a structural model involves an 
outcome equation that can be defined, for instance, as a utility function maximized under the 
budget constraint. The presence of the budget constraint, besides defining individual’s 
decisional process, allows the identification. This is achieved thanks to the presence of a 
policy instrument that provides an exogenous source of variation, meaning that it affects only 
the budget constraint without directly influencing the outcome-specific equation. The source 
of variation can be also provided by an element different from the policy instrument object of 
the analysis, but able to provide a policy-relevant variation, therefore a variation that is 
isomorphic to that of the policy instrument.  
In this dissertation returns to higher education in the U.K. has been evaluated. The 
motivation relies on the empirical evidence observed in this sector over last decades, starting 
from the 1960s. The Government has faced an intensive increase in the volume of students 
enrolled into undergraduate courses, with the consequence that resources addressed to funding 
them started to be not sufficient. The solution to the funding problems materialized into a 
series of reforms that from the 1990s onwards were issued. They introduced and subsequently 
modified access costs and benefits, like fees, grants and loans.  
After the introduction of these reforms, several authors examined the causal effect exerted 
by new access rules on the enrolment rate, guided by the evidence suggested by data: the gap 
in the participation rate between “low-income” and “high-income” individuals. The literature 
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presented in previous chapters demonstrates that financial measures in favour of less-wealthy 
students are effective in reducing the existing gap and that familiar backgrounds seems to play 
a crucial role in children’s future choice. Therefore, we are dealing with a sector in which the 
Government has to deal with multiple objectives, consisting in the promotion of participation 
among all social classes, and the attribution of the appropriate amount of resources to all 
institutes in order to promote an efficient service. This scenario raises questions related to 
what could be the right policy instrument that can ameliorate this situation. 
Returns to higher education in the U.K. has been studied here applying the Generalized 
Roy model, estimated parametrically through the two-step estimator method. It implies that 
the “budget constraint” defined through a latent index structure, is estimated through 
Maximum Likelihood obtaining different values of the propensity scores; after this, the 
alternative-specific outcome equation is estimated through OLS including the appropriate 
correction term. 
 The Generalized Roy model has been used in the literature to study the returns to 
education under essential heterogeneity, a situation in which returns are assumed to vary 
between individual given their unobservables characteristics. This framework has several 
implications, since it may lead to biased estimates when applying traditional estimation 
methods like OLS or IV. Individuals that normally differ in unobservable characteristics, like 
ability, motivation, determination and other cognitive and non-cognitive skills are driven by 
these factors during their decisional process, creating the ability bias commonly known. These 
factors cause also the heterogeneity in returns, since they are normally affected by ability and 
other personal characteristics, besides education, experience and labour market’s conditions. 
Therefore, if individuals are aware of their idiosyncratic returns to education, they can act on 
this knowledge at the time when they decide to enrol, generating another kind of bias: the 
selection on unobservables bias; if more clever or capable students are those who enrol, we 
say that there is selection in gains.  
The existence of this mechanism has implications on the kind of parameter estimated. As 
discussed in Chapter 2., under essential heterogeneity the only relevant parameter that can 
draw a picture of this situation is the marginal treatment effect, a parameter that define the 
returns to education for individuals at the margin of indifference, thus individuals which are 
indifferent between participating or not. The marginal treatment effect varies with respect to 
different values of the unobserved component that influence the probability of participating, 
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therefore it tells what would be the return for individuals with different unobservable 
characteristics if they would be induced to college by a marginal change in their probability to 
enrol.  
Unfortunately, the attempt to estimate this parameter with the data chosen (the BHPS) has 
been inconclusive. The main problems faced in conducting this analysis concern in particular 
the data management. Even if data from eleven subsequent years have been selected, the 
relevant sample has revealed to be too small and this can be considered the first cause for non-
significant results. 
 Moreover, the availability of necessary variables was also limited. Several variables had to 
be derived or even if available, reported a high number of missing values, involving the 
choice of alternative measures that serve as a proxy (e.g. qualification achieved at 16 years 
old); nevertheless, in the case of the instrumental variable distance, the lack of postcodes 
identifying the area of residence, generated difficulties in the calculation of the distance from 
the nearest institute.  
The analysis therefore stopped at the first stage regression, from which the only conclusion 
is that there is not a sufficient evidence of statistical significance. This implies that the model 
is not identified, since the instruments seems not to provide the necessary exogenous variation 
to satisfy the exclusion restriction.  
A potential replication of this analysis should, first of all, rely on another dataset, that has 
to be panel in order to observe an individual from 18 to 18+t years old, age in which labour 
wages are observed, and has to provide the necessary variables to create subsamples of treated 
and untreated of a suitable size.  
Due to these shortcomings, the analysis has stopped, and the ex- ante evaluation could not 
be performed. As presented in the theoretical framework described in this thesis, the 
identification of the marginal treatment effect in general allows to perform not only ex-post 
evaluation, but also the ex-ante one. Indeed, it is possible to estimate how the probability to 
enrol would change under marginal change in the value of the policy instruments. Given new 
potential value of the propensity score, we can define the mean effect for an individual that is 
induced to participate by a certain intervention, as expressed by the policy relevant treatment 
effect. 
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In any case, if necessary data to analyse the returns to education were not available, it is 
still possible to develop a useful ex-ante evaluation, in order to analyse, for instance, the 
effect of certain reforms on the participation rate among the “low-income” individuals, being 
them the category still less present in the higher education sector. Exploiting methodologies 
explained in Chapter 1., it is not to exclude that a valid structural model can be selected, 
validated (relying on a reasonable number of empirical studies in the literature) and used to 
run counterfactual analysis. 
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